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Journal of Administration Overseas

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INCLUDING

The Planning of the British Aid Programme
by R. B. M. King

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by Barrie Macdonald

Northern Nigerian Managers –
an African Commercial Elite
by Brian H. A. Ranson

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by H. S. Verma

BOOK REVIEWS
by Paul Streeten, Tarlok Singh, Dunstan Omari, J. H. Smith, B. B. Schaffer, Peter Yeo

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Editor's Notes

How does a donor country plan its programme of assistance to developing countries? This question is often asked both at home and overseas and we are very glad in this Number to include Mr. King's clear exposition of how the British aid machinery operates.

The second part of Barrie Macdonald's article on the Gilbert and Ellice Isles sets out the difficulties now facing poor scattered and thinly populated Pacific Islands seeking to evolve a satisfactory system of local administration. The long term difficulties are enhanced by the short span of phosphates – accruing prosperity – all too soon to be exhausted. Nonetheless many of the problems have a familiar ring; friction between elected chairman and chief executive officer, central control of estimates, unpopular compulsory "self-help" schemes, of course inadequate funds; one finds an issue made over *all* fees and fines going to general revenue (in the 1970s one would expect at least all revenue accruing from fines for offences against local bye-laws as a revenue source to local treasuries). Bye-laws must needs be ***intra vires*** and inevitably reference to the Attorney-General's busy chambers will cause delay to drafts that deviate from approved models – elsewhere a satisfactory solution has been found by granting to local authorities the power to make "orders" for specific purposes including local amendment to customary law, which require no prior reference to a Colony secretariat, with the longer procedure required for regulations and bye-laws. Macdonald suggests that the solution lies in decentralization with the district office on each Island group converted into a department of local government – this seems a rational and attractive approach.

Entrepreneurship comes easily to West African men and women, so it is no surprise that Nigerians have rapidly acquired the capacity to manage local business enterprises with success. Mr. Ranson studies a group of these managers in the Northern States and paints in the somewhat "Eurafrican" attitudes many seem to have adopted to meet the diverse problem of work and leisure hours. Whether in the more sophisticated Southern areas of Nigeria a similar study would have found managers as little trained and with as limited an educational background, must be a matter for conjecture.

We are conscious of a tendency to publish articles which generalize on broad administrative issues rather than those that focus attention on the detailed problems which administrators face day by day in the course of their work. We welcome, therefore, the simple story of decision-making at village level in India which is told by Mr. Verma. He provides a heartening illustration of how men of goodwill can succeed in overcoming a thorny problem at grass roots level to the satisfaction of the opposing and irate parties concerned.

Finally Mr. Hoyle examines the complementary though sometimes conflicting roles of administrator and planner, and the problems involved in effecting adjustment to civil service attitudes if development goals are to be reached.

Cambridge Conference on Development. The next Conference will be held at St. John's College, Cambridge, 19th to 27th September, 1972. Paul Streeten, Warden of Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, will take the chair. The subject for debate will be "*Trade and Development*".

The Planning of the British Aid Programme*

By R. B. M. KING

Mr. King is Deputy Secretary at the Overseas Development Administration

Introduction

THE origin of this paper lies in the criticism that has been levelled from time to time, notably in the evidence given to the Select Committee on Aid last year, that the British aid programme is inadequately planned and that it is difficult to detect either the processes by which decisions affecting aid allocations are reached or the policies which underlie such decisions. The purpose of the paper is therefore to describe how these decisions are arrived at, in the hope that this will shed some light on both these questions. Before discussing the main issue it may be helpful to set out the place which the official aid programme occupies in relation to financial transfers generally to the developing countries – i.e. in relation to the UNCTAD 1 per cent target.

The target of 1 per cent of gross domestic product to be transferred to developing countries (which H.M.G. have said they will do their best to reach by 1975) comprises a number of different components. There is first the official aid programme net of capital repayments but *not* net of interest. The official development assistance (Aid Programme) figure for the U.K. in 1970 was 0·37 per cent. Secondly there are "other official flows" which in the U.K.'s case are virtually non-existent, and made no significant difference to the percentage figure for 1970. Thirdly there is private investment net of disinvestment. This covers both direct private investment and portfolio investment – e.g. loans raised on the London market, purchases by individuals of bonds issued by governments of developing countries. Estimates of the 1970 flow are not yet available but the level during the last three years has been running at an average of 0·26 per cent. Fourthly there are guaranteed private export credits (net) of maturity more than one year. The provisional 1970 figure for these was 0·36 per cent. Lastly it has now been agreed internationally to include grants of a developmental character from voluntary organizations. These amounted to 0·03 per cent in 1970 to give a U.K. total (allowing for rounding of the figures) of 1·03 per cent.

The Official Aid Programme

We are concerned here with only the first of these flows. Before the setting up of the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) in 1964 there was no planned aid programme as such. Individual requests for aid were considered on their merits and the total of the expected disbursements arising from the

* This article was originally prepared by Mr. King for a discussion meeting organised by the Overseas Development Institute on 14th June 1971.

acceptance of these requests were lumped together for statistical purposes into a total sum which became known as the aid programme. Shortly after the ODM was formed it was decided as part of a process under which all public expenditure was classified under a number of broad headings to allocate an "aid ceiling" one year ahead which fixed a maximum sum which could be disbursed on all forms of economic aid. As part of the Public Expenditure Survey procedure introduced in 1969 the Government now publishes block figures of expenditure four years ahead. The aid programme is separately identified in this, so that Overseas Development Administration (ODA successor to ODM) is now able to plan its activities in full knowledge of the total sums available to it four years ahead. This is a great advance in control techniques and greatly contributes to the effective administration of official aid.

The first point to stress is that the figures in the programme for particular years are of *disbursements* not commitments. Thus the expenditure does not arise until the bills relating to the shipment of goods, or whatever form the aid takes, have been presented and paid by the ODA. This is usually a long time – two or three years perhaps – after the commitment has been entered into. The task of managing the aid programme – perhaps more of an art than a science – is therefore one of entering into commitments at such times and of such sizes as are likely to give rise to disbursements adding up in total to the aid programme for the year. The situation until very recently has been that if in the event actual disbursements add up to less than this, the balance is lost since funds voted in one year cannot at present be carried forward: if they add up to more than this, supplementary provision must be obtained from Parliament. Only in one year (when devaluation affected the programme) has the latter situation obtained. However, very recently, as a result of a recommendation by the Select Committee on Aid it has been announced that a small amount of carry-over of underspending from one year to another caused by circumstances beyond the control of H.M.G. will be permitted, subject to Parliamentary approval, and equally, a small amount of overspending in one year can be set off against the programme for the following year. This measure will facilitate in a number of ways the task of controlling the aid programme and make it more likely that we shall achieve the target in any one year.

The second point is that the figures are gross – i.e. they take no account of capital or interest repayments on previous loans. The latter are factors taken into account in determining the total size of the programme and also the allocation to each country. But for purposes of controlling the programme we work on gross figures.

The official aid programme includes all Government economic expenditure to and on behalf of the developing countries, Commonwealth and foreign, including advances to the Commonwealth Development Corporation. It includes both multilateral and bilateral payments, capital aid, budgetary aid and technical assistance. Certain scientific units in the United Kingdom carrying out research and development work on problems affecting the developing world are also financed from the programme.

Planning the Programme

The principal instruments by which the programme is planned are the Aid Framework and the Country Policy Papers. Each of these is discussed in more detail below.

The Aid Framework

The Aid Framework is a detailed breakdown of the aid programme figures – i.e. expected disbursements – for the years covered by the Public Expenditure Review – that is four years ahead. The programme is first of all broken down into a number of main headings, viz multilateral contributions, technical assistance, CDC, pensions payments, bilateral capital aid to the dependencies, and bilateral capital aid to independent countries. The multilateral heading is further divided into contributions to IDA, to the various Regional Development Banks, to the various UN programmes and to a miscellaneous group including the Commonwealth Scheme of Technical Assistance, the Indus Basin Fund etc. The Technical Assistance heading comprises two main groups, the Regional Programmes of Technical Assistance, e.g. Colombo Plan, Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan and similar programmes covering other regions of the world; and Functional Technical Assistance which embraces a wide variety of purposes ranging from our salary supplementation schemes for British personnel occupying executive positions in Governments and public authorities in the developing countries, to the cost of scientific units in the U.K. and grants to such bodies as the City and Guilds of London Institute and the Institute of Development Studies. The cost of the Commonwealth Education Scheme also comes under this heading as does the ODA's share of financing the British Council.

The initiative in compiling the framework rests with the ODA. Once a year when the annual global public expenditure exercise has been completed, forecasts of expenditure are collected from each of the ODA departments responsible for the particular programme. These forecasts of course reflect the policy in relation to that programme which the ODA department concerned wishes to recommend (vide the paragraphs on Country Policy Papers below). The proposals are brought together in the Finance Department of the ODA and internal meetings are then held to adjust the figures within the total funds available taking account of the general priorities as set by Ministers. This document after discussion with and provisional approval by the Minister for Overseas Development becomes the draft Aid Framework. This is then discussed with other interested departments in Whitehall and any differences of opinion are resolved, if necessary by discussion between Ministers. Thereafter the ODA makes commitments in accordance with the disbursement pattern in the framework as finally agreed.

There are five points to be noted in connection with the Aid Framework as a tool of aid management. First, since we are dealing with figures of disbursements not commitments the figures appearing in the first year of the four year period very largely arise from commitments already entered into. The degree to which the funds available in later years are committed decreases year by year. By way of illustration disbursements arising from commitments to an IDA replenishment exercise extend over some eight years from the date of

commitment; and a large bilateral project loan may well disburse over four or five years ahead. Hence the scope for taking new initiatives in planning the programme is relatively limited in the immediate future but grows steadily year by year for the later years of the forward planning period. The static nature of the aid programme over the last few years has made it even more difficult to contemplate any significant new initiatives, but the increased figures now announced up to 1974/75 provide considerable scope for such initiatives.

The second point is that since in our experience individual forecasts of future expenditure are in very many cases too high because of the incidence of events over which one has no control and cannot foresee (e.g. civil war, revolution, difficulties in tendering etc.), we arrange that the total of the individual forecasts is about 25 per cent higher than the aid programme figure. On this basis we expect actual expenditure just about to hit the target. One of the difficulties in controlling the expenditure during the year is that it is impossible sensibly to disburse appreciable sums of money quickly. As already explained any commitment takes time to work itself through to the stage of disbursements; very few of our aid operations take the form of a straight handout of cash, and those that do usually have implications affecting future years. The scope for avoiding overall underspending in any one year by short-term measures is therefore extremely limited.

Thirdly in putting forward their bids for the framework, the individual departments in the ODA will take into account a variety of factors. First the development needs and potential of the country or programme concerned; secondly the extent to which wider political relationship between H.M.G. and the Government of the recipient country or organization affect our aid relationship; and thirdly the U.K.'s commercial interests. Subsequent consideration of the framework with other departments in Whitehall centres round the interplay of these various factors in determining priorities for our available funds.

Fourthly the framework is a flexible instrument used as a basis for planning and controlling the programme. It is not a rigid strait-jacket of expenditure. At the end of the year it will be found that some items are overspent, others underspent, according to circumstances. An amount is set aside for meeting unforeseen needs such as relief and rehabilitation following natural or man-made disasters and this sum is run down over the year so as to ensure that it is wholly spent.

Lastly the aid framework documents are internal working papers. They cannot be published because they are based on intentions and assumptions which may not in the event be realised; the framework figures are revised each year at the time of the annual exercise in the light of developments that have taken place in the interim. Individual commitments are of course announced to Parliament and the Press as soon as they have been entered into.

Country Policy Papers

As already stated above, individual departments of ODA put forward their bids taking into account the relevant factors. The management tool which is

employed by the geographical departments of ODA in formulating requirements for bilateral capital aid and technical assistance is the Country Policy Paper, introduced into the ODA in 1969.

Once a year a paper is prepared for each of our main recipient countries – some 45 in all. The object is to analyse all the factors which need to be taken into account in reaching decisions about the scale and nature of our aid to each of these recipients. The papers are all prepared on the basis of a standard model, though the depth of analysis depends on the size of our programme for the country and its relation to the recipient country's economy as a whole.

The papers start with a brief statistical description of the recipient country's economy giving estimates of the trend for the previous five years and where possible the likely future position in relation to such matters as GNP, population, aid per head from all sources, balance of payments, debt servicing, trade with the U.K., U.K. investment and the position in relation to IMF drawings. A second section then gives by way of general introduction the historical background to the aid programme and the political and commercial background, and brief descriptions of the main economic developments likely in the future. A third section makes an assessment of past performance in such fields as development planning, administration, tax and savings ratios, efforts to promote exports, and utilization of aid. A fourth section sets out the recipient government's development policies and priorities for the next five years with a brief assessment of the development potential and prospect by main sectors, identifying the main constraints that have to be overcome. A fifth section indicates the form of aid required to overcome the main development constraints as identified in the fourth section, showing the relative priorities attached to each form of aid, e.g. programme aid, project aid, local cost aid, technical assistance for pre-investment studies, manpower aid, etc. A sixth section discusses the other factors to be taken into account, i.e. the political and commercial relationships with the recipient. A seventh section sets out the amounts and types of aid provided over the last five years by the international agencies, other bilateral donors and by the U.K., giving where possible an evaluation of the results achieved. The eighth and crucial section of the paper then sets out the proposed amounts and forms of aid from the U.K. for the next five years showing how this fits in with the recipient country's development priorities and the likely future aid programmes of other donors, taking into account any political and commercial considerations which are relevant. This section indicates the main sectors of the economy towards which the British aid effort should be directed and the relative priorities attached to the different types of aid. It also indicates the proposed terms and conditions of U.K. aid in relation to the recipient government's ability to service debt, in relation to terms and conditions of other donors' aid and to other relevant factors. Lastly the paper contains a schedule of the main capital projects and feasibility studies being undertaken from British aid and the expected disbursements on each of them during the following five years.

The bulk of the analysis is prepared by the member of the Economic Planning Staff attached to the geographical department of ODA concerned. The paper is then sent in draft to the British Mission in the country concerned

for comment and amplification. The Mission's comments on all aspects of the paper are welcomed, but Missions are particularly well-placed to advise on political, commercial and investment aspects. After this stage the paper is circulated to interested departments in Whitehall and is discussed at a meeting convened and chaired at high level in the ODA. At this stage decisions are reached about the proposed size and content of our aid effort to each of the 45 recipients covered by this procedure, and the geographical departments are then responsible for translating the agreed country policies into practice. Individual projects are closely appraised and those over £400,000 in value are submitted to a high-level Committee in ODA presided over by a Deputy Secretary, which then submits the project to the Minister for final decision.

For obvious reasons country policy papers, like the aid framework itself, could not be published since they are internal working documents leading up to the formulation of policy.

Conclusion

This then is the mechanism by which the official aid programme is planned and controlled. It is relatively new and is still evolving. It is hoped that the two main flanks of the system – the annual aid framework exercise and the country policy papers – will shortly become the main instruments by which the Treasury will exercise its responsibility of broad financial control of ODA activities, leaving ODA free to take subsequent expenditure decisions within the agreed pattern of policy.

Local Government in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, 1892-1969—Part 2

By BARRIE MACDONALD

Mr. Macdonald is a research scholar in the Department of Pacific History, at the Australian National University, Canberra.

THE decision to call a Gilbert Islands Magistrates' Conference in 1951 marked a new phase of policy for both central and local government. *A Memorandum on Post-War Reorganization and Administrative Policy* had recommended the early creation of a Council of Representatives for the Colony. Administrative Officers hoped that the Magistrates' Conference, by beginning as a course for training in local government work and familiarization with central government procedures, could be expanded to form such a council. It was intended to give the magistrates responsibility for the allocation of funds to the Island Councils as soon as possible and then gradually to increase their responsibility to cover other spheres of government activity. In fact, the Magistrates' Conference, apart from being a sounding board on some policy matters, remained a training school, meeting three times between 1951 and 1954. Two Gilbertese-speaking magistrates from the Ellice Islands attended the 1952 Conference, as observers, as part of an unfulfilled plan to organize a similar conference for the Ellice. In 1956 all Colony magistrates, five regional delegates, and representatives from commerce and the missions combined to meet as a Colony Conference – the first representative body to meet in the Colony.

At the 1952 Conference the magistrates were told that the government was considering reorganizing the Island Councils, and were asked for their comments. The magistrates agreed that the Councils as established four years earlier were largely ineffective, and attributed their failure to two main causes. They considered that the Councils had been set up by the government to perform certain functions on the islands, but their role and potential was not understood by many people. The result was to leave the *katei* (Gilbertese customary code of social and governmental relationships) in the hands of traditional authorities on many islands. Secondly, the magistrates, who always tended towards the authoritarian, considered that elected members did not have the same status in their communities as the old Kaubure. With elections being introduced young men offered themselves in order to avoid communal works, and people preferred to elect weak men who would not be rigorous in their enforcement of the Island Regulations. When asked to suggest remedies, however, the magistrates could produce few ideas, and thereafter relied on the guidance of the District Officer in charge of the Conference.[1]

[1] *Report of the* 1952 *Magistrates' Conference*, GEIC, Secretariat, 2nd Series, F37/7/1. (Central Archives).

At this stage the Administration believed that the only solution to the problem lay in a separation of judical and executive functions and the restoration of the Chief of Kaubure to his original position as head of the island government. There was to be a separate corps of magistrates, especially trained, and liable to transfer away from their home islands. A wider representation of views was considered desirable for the Councils and it was proposed that mission and co-operative interests should be given a voice, and the Councils' membership be supplemented by certain government officials stationed on the islands – in particular teachers and wireless operators, in addition to the senior medical officer for each island who had been a member since 1948. (Problems arising from Ellice islanders in these positions based in the Gilberts, and vice versa, were briefly considered and dismissed.) Officers of the Administration unanimously agreed that the Councils should be given greater responsibilities, especially over the collection and expenditure of local revenues and the appointment of their officers. The Native Governments Ordinance was to be repealed in sections and replaced by an Island Councils Ordinance, a Native Courts Ordinance, and a Native Lands Ordinance[2].

The magistrates' reaction to these proposals was one of extreme caution. They agreed that the Island Council members should be the real community leaders, but had grave doubts as to whether such men could be chosen successfully by an elective process. They acknowledged that the work involved in administrative and judicial duties was becoming excessive but were reluctant to accept the elevation of the Chief of Kaubure as the best solution.

Mid-way through the drafting process there was a further revision of policy. Proposals for completely new ordinances were deferred at the instance of the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, and a partial modification of the existing ordinance agreed to. At discussions attended by the High Commissioner, the Resident Commissioner and senior Colony staff, in May 1954, it was agreed that:

> "the Magistrate should be retained in both his judicial and executive capacities as Head of the Island Government and chairman of the Council, and that he should also be regarded as the agent for the Central Government".[3]

Proposals to allow the Councils a limited degree of financial responsibility were approved, but it was firmly laid down that the intention was not to create fully autonomous local authorities – island governments were to be regarded as agencies of the central government.[4]

The *Native Government* (*Amendment*) *Ordinance*, 1955, and the *Native Governments* (*Financial Powers*) *Ordinance* of the same year introduced such changes as were now deemed to be necessary. Colony officials considered that the changed role of the Island Councils would not be understood, especially

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[2] See GEIC, Secretariat, 2nd Series, F10/1/1.
[3] Minutes of discussions held at Tarawa, 13 May 1954, GEIC, G.I.D.O., 2nd Series, F29/3/8(II).
[4] *ibid.*

among the more conservative Gilbertese, as long as the title of "Kaubure" was retained for councillors. The Chief of Kaubure remained as before, but the executive functions of the Kaubure were taken over by the "district police" who had been, in practice, the Kaubure's assistants. The jury role of the Kaubure was taken over by a panel of assessors to be appointed by the resident commissioner. "Native Members" of Island Councils were to be elected in such numbers and from such areas as the Administrative Officer for the island should determine, with provision for the appointment of additional members by the resident commissioner if considered necessary to ensure the service of those considered to be the "true community leaders". All officers were to be elected for a three-year term.

The scope of Island Council activities was considerably expanded by the new Ordinances. The councils were to provide such services as they considered necessary, or the district officer should direct, for the general health, security or well-being of the inhabitants of the islands. Each council was to hold an Island Fund to be composed of court fines and fees, licence fees and local taxation levied with the approval of a district officer. A further clause was inserted to allow the payment of subventions by government. Estimates were to be prepared annually for the approval of the resident commissioner through a district officer.

The 1955 Ordinances, introduced to various islands during 1956 and 1957, failed to remedy the problems existing in local government. The doubts expressed by the magistrates in 1952 concerning the calibre of members elected to Island Councils were quickly confirmed. Weak men, who generally failed to enforce island regulations, and others, who sought exemption from communal works, were elected while, as before, influential island leaders remained aloof. The resident commissioner's power to appoint additional members proved an inadequate safeguard with the result that most Island Councils lacked the understanding and education demanded by the new constitution. Magistrates and Chiefs of Kaubure, both government appointees, tended to dominate the island governments. Consequently little progress was made in establishing the principle that the Island Councils were, in fact, local authorities, as well as agencies of government, worthy of interest and support. While the *Native Governments (Amendment) Ordinance* had increased considerably the powers and responsibilities of the Island Councils it had, at the same time, created opportunities for a greater degree of control from the district office. Partly because of inadequate shipping and partly, too, as an expression of a belief in a more centralized concept of administration, district officers for the Gilbert Islands had been based on Tarawa for increasing periods rather than on the headquarters islands of the sub-districts. "Whistle-stop" touring became more frequent. District officers, unless engaged in lands work, could no longer spend long periods of residence on outer islands supervising and training local officials. Contact tended to be brief and, of necessity, confined to the principal officers of the island governments. The result was a rapid break-down in communication between the central and local administrations.

Other problems arose. Salaries of local officials were based on the assumption that the positions were part-time only while on many islands magistrates,

scribes and chiefs of Kaubure were engaged full-time in their official capacities. Official employment, with the low salaries offered, had little to commend it to more educated men.[5] The replacement of the Kaubure by assessors in the Native Courts served to hinder the course of "British" justice. With long-serving Kaubure it had been possible, through training, partially to instil the concept of impartial justice and examination of evidence. Abbreviated touring no longer permitted such luxuries in the case of large panels of assessors who were drawn from the entire adult population. Assessors tended to judge a case in the light of their knowledge of the plaintiff, the defendant, their respective families and the current state of local politics.[6] True, such decisions often meant more harmonious village life but they could also intensify personal and religious rivalries.

The *Native Governments* (*Financial Powers*) *Ordinance* was designed to increase the financial responsibilities of the Island Councils. In practice it had the opposite effect. In addition to paying salaries of local government officials, and for local services, the Island Councils were obliged to pay all Colony teachers, medical dressers and nurses based on their islands. In 1958 only four of the islands in the Gilbert and Ellice groups were able to balance their budgets unaided. The remaining twenty all received subventions. In the case of one Ellice Island the subsidy amounted to 70 per cent of revenue. There was little incentive for wealthier islands to achieve financial independence as 50 per cent of all surplus funds were collected by the government as a contribution towards subsidies for other islands. According to figures prepared in 1962, the assumption by the central government of responsibility for the salaries of Colony staff employed on outer islands would have allowed fourteen islands to balance their budgets, and six of the remaining ten to come within easy distance of doing so. The cost of such a change would have been £3750 in excess of the £8536 being paid in subventions but would have provided incentives for development for a majority of islands. The figures show that in the four years that the system had been in operation the island governments had taken over part of the cost of their administration from the government without a reciprocal growth of responsibility. Heavy reliance on subventions, and attempts to reduce these to a minimum, automatically resulted in closer supervision by administrative officers. The frustrations inherent in the system are made clear in a district officer's report on an "Estimates" meeting with an Island Council:

> After discussing the Revenue and Expenditure it was apparent that in fact the meeting was nothing more than a facade as the council members have virtually no say in how their money should be spent. Having started the meeting with a talk stressing that it was their own money that they were spending and that they should remember their responsibility to the taxpayer we went on to discuss the salaries of the Local Government Officials, Teachers Dressers etc. When they wanted to change these salaries I had to explain, to everyone's

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[5] *Memorandum on Local Government Policy in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony*, GEIC, Secretariat, 1963.

[6] Travelling Diary, Beru, May 1959, GEIC, Secretariat, 2nd Series, F10/11/12.

> confusion, that although it was their money, in fact they could *not* spend it how they liked but according to government's wishes.[7]

By 1962 the island governments were in a sorry state. The magistrate was firmly established in his paramount position and tended to become even more the master rather than the servant of his Council. The calibre of councillors was low and the public attitude towards local government was apathetic in the absence of any incentive to make it otherwise. With the Colony Government prepared to balance the budget there was little interest on the part of the Councils in producing a surplus, and even less in promoting the development of island services. The burden of salaries of Colony staff was a further source of resentment and disillusionment. The Island Councils had become ineffective and moribund branches of the central government. Except at Butaritari and Makin, where the high chief and his family held offices in local government, traditional authorities on the islands, and especially the *unimane* of the southern Gilberts, continued to remain outside the formal structure of local government, being content to pull strings and control the social life of their islands. Although the councils in the Ellice Islands suffered from severe financial difficulties, there was little division of interest within the communities. Island councillors and deacons tended to be synonymous, and in practice there was little distinction between temporal and spiritual affairs. A reappraisal of the local government system in 1962 revealed most of the defects in the structure and its application. The succeeding four years were taken up with a consideration of acceptable alternatives and the preparation of a new ordinance.

VI

Proposals for revising the local government structure were discussed at the 1962 Colony Conference, and with the Acting High Commissioner the following year. As before, Colony officers favoured the creation of island councils, with elected majorities, and separate island courts which would form the bottom tier in a reorganized judicial system. The establishment of a unified central and local government service was an essential part of the scheme. Island Executive Officers were to be selected, trained and appointed by the Colony Government and would serve as seconded officers to local governments fulfilling the duties of clerks to councils, courts and land courts. They would also perform limited duties as agents for the government. Salaries of teachers, telecommunications officers, police and some medical officers were to be the responsibility of central government leaving local authorities to provide houses and offices, and to pay land rents.[8]

By the *Island Courts Ordinance* of 1965, the separation of judicial and executive functions in local government, advocated by many officials since the 1930s, was finally achieved. The essence of the 1962 proposals remained but significant changes had been made in the light of discussions with representatives of the Western Pacific High Commission and the Colonial Office; most

[7] Tour Report, Nonouti, July-August 1962, GEIC, G.I.D.O., F3/16/23.
[8] *Memorandum on Local Government Policy in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony*, 1963, loc. cit.

modifications tended to bring the Colony's legislation in line with that passed for the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1963.

The courts established by the 1965 Ordinance were to be composed of three members – President, Vice-President and an ordinary member – appointed by the resident commissioner. The new Island courts were to have limited jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases and were to be subordinate to Colony Magistrates' Courts. Maximum sentences authorized under the Ordinance were six months' imprisonment and/or a fine of $100.[9] The Island courts were authorized to decide cases under both Colony law and the by-laws passed by Island Councils. Magistrates, usually touring district officers, were empowered to review all decisions of Island courts.

By the time the *Local Government Ordinance* was published in 1966 it had been decided that all members of the Island councils should be elected for a three-year term, with one-third retiring annually in rotation. Presidents and Vice-Presidents were to be elected, as hitherto suggested. Membership of councils, and the franchise, were open to all British subjects and protected persons who were over 21 years of age and living in a council area.

The functions of the councils established under the Ordinance were much wider than those granted by any predecessor. In addition to the usual duties of preserving order, providing good government, maintaining birth, death and marriage registers, and passing health and cleanliness regulations, the councils were expected to play a far greater role in providing social and other services for the islands.

A choice of rates was open to the councils, the most important being a basic per capita rate and a land tax. For development projects and buildings the government indicated a willingness to make grants or loans depending on the nature of the venture and the availability of funds. Estimates were to be prepared annually for the approval of the resident commissioner.

The proposal to establish a single civil service for the Colony was dropped on the insistence of the High Commissioner who also stipulated that Island executive officers' salaries should not be equated with those for comparable positions in the Colony service. Island executive officers were to be under the control of a statutory body, the Local Government Service Board, and officers would not be permitted to transfer between the two services. Large numbers of applications were received, however, for the first local government training course which was held in 1966. Graduates from the course were posted to the reconstructed councils at the end of that year.

The new legislation, effective from 1967, marked a revolutionary change in the concept of local government for the colony. Previously, "native governments" had been largely concerned with petty administrative tasks, their activities being centred on the "government stations" on their respective islands. The old native governments were inexpensive, made few demands on the people and were unproductive in terms of economic (especially agricultural) development and social services. The 1966 *Local Government*

[9] The Colony uses Australian Currency.

Ordinance attempted to introduce a democratic system of control as an incentive for community development. It was hoped that the expansion of democratic procedures at the island level would complement Colony constitutional development. While the Island councils have made considerable progress in some directions, since the Ordinance was introduced, their overall achievements have fallen considerably below expectation.

From the outset the chances of success were limited as the new system was never satisfactorily explained outside Tarawa. Broadcasting and written propaganda were relied upon to a large extent but neither of these media has ever proved satisfactory in the Colony. Shipping and staffing problems limited the time that district officers could spend explaining the legislation on the islands and most officials were handicapped by an inability to speak the vernacular languages. Further, the need for change was not appreciated by those who were to serve on, and be ruled by, the new councils. To most people on the outer islands the changes were being made at the whim of the government or, more specifically, its European administrators. Many community leaders regretted the passing of the authoritarian powers of the magistrate, which were regarded as necessary to ensure village and island harmony. Councils and Presidents were elected but were given virtually no training. In the absence of extensive touring to compensate for these problems, the Island Executive Officers were left, by default, on many islands, as the only men with any understanding of the situation and the training to meet its demands.

Despite the large number of applications for the local government training course the calibre of candidates, especially in written and spoken English, was not particularly high. Perhaps the explanation can be found in the difficulty and variety of work involved compared with the low salaries offered. The duties of an Island Executive Officer include the collection and control of island funds and some Colony funds, the ordering of materials for, and the supervision of, building projects, the purchase of stores, supervision of labour and extra-mural prisoners, supervision and control of subordinate staff, responsibility for keeping lands registers, the payment of salaries and administration of the Provident Fund (for local government employees), correspondence between councils and the Government, the annual organization of local elections and the preparation and execution of by-laws. In addition he is required to serve as clerk to a Lands Court, an Island Council and an Island Court.[10] Of the 27 Island executive officers at post in July 1969, 14 were on Scale I salaries ($396 – $612), seven on Scale II ($516 – $756) and six on Scale III ($636 – $906). None were on Scale IV ($846 – $1080) which is a personal promotion grade. Colony Government executive officers with similar duties, but working under constant supervision, receive commencing salaries of $912.[11]

In the absence of a comprehensive education programme, conflict between Island executive officers and council presidents was inevitable. Relative

[10] *Memorandum on Local Government Policy*, July 1969, GEIC, Secretariat, 3rd Series, F113/12/9.

[11] *ibid.*, GEIC, *Civil List*, 1969; Local Government Service Board, *Staff Instructions*, 1969, App. A and B.

powers and responsibilities were not clearly defined and, as yet, a handbook in the vernaculars for this purpose, planned since 1968, has not been produced. Told that they were now the heads of the island administrations many presidents attempted to assume the powers of their predecessors, the native magistrates. The Island executive officers, on the other hand, were placed in the key position by virtue of their duties, were specially trained, and were often impatient with dilatory councillors. Further, many Island executive officers emerged from their training with the firm impression that they held the most important and powerful office in local government. Such attitudes were common among those who had previously held office in the native governments. It is interesting that it is the latter who, with guidance and experience, have become the most efficient, if not the most popular, executive officers.

For the most part the election machinery established by the Ordinance has worked satisfactorily. Often, especially in the Ellice and southern Gilbert Islands, informal village meetings have been held prior to the elections at which the old men have indicated who should serve on the council. Such pre-selection procedures have proved efficient, caused little friction, and frequently rendered an election unnecessary.

With one-third of the councillors, as well as the president, retiring each year, many Island Councils suffer from a lack of continuity, thus further reducing the value of any formal or informal training. Few councillors appreciate the full potential of their role in local government and many are less concerned with council affairs than with assuming the functions of the defunct island police. On some Gilbert Islands religious rivalry is carried into local politics, being most frequently expressed in disputes over the erection and maintenance of school buildings. Only a limited number of councillors have a working knowledge of English and the majority are therefore handicapped in their attempts to understand island estimates and by-laws and Colony legislation. Four years after its publication the *Local Government Ordinance* is still not available in the Gilbertese or Ellice languages. Councillors have had difficulty in understanding policies which affect more than their individual islands and, in common with the population at large, have generally failed to appreciate the Colony's future financial problems which will follow the exhaustion of the Ocean Island phosphates in about 1976.

As soon as practicable after the declaration of the Protectorates a land tax was instituted and remained the most significant local tax until 1966. A tax on "immovable property" was one of the options allowed the Island Councils in the 1966 Ordinance and has been retained on all islands. It was intended that the tax would be graduated according to the formulae drawn up by the Cartland Land Commission between 1947 and 1956, with assessments based on both area and fertility. In practice some islands have tended to levy a flat rate "per land" with gradations dependent on the number of lands owned by an individual.[12] Others have retained the total assessment for any given piece of land for each part of it when the land has been sub-divided. Despite

[12] Scarcity of land, resulting in extensive fragmentation, has always been a problem in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. A 'land' may vary in size from a few square yards to, in exceptional cases, 20 acres.

occasional protests of injustice the land tax, however assessed, is accepted and understood by the majority of landowners.

Perhaps the most unpopular demand made on the islanders throughout the history of British administration has been for "communal works", which usually involved the maintenance of roads and local administration buildings. Some projects, for example the repair of village *maneabas*, were seldom opposed as their maintenance was a traditional obligation. Under the *Island Regulations* of 1953 and 1954 men and women between the ages of 16 and 60, with some exceptions dependent on employment, were obliged to work for a maximum of 24 days per year on social services. While the system provided cheap labour and building materials it was most unpopular on the islands, the element of compulsion was considered undesirable and it was decided to abolish the obligation in favour of paid labour and increased local taxation. As expected, the proposal for a new tax was greeted with extreme caution, especially in communities with limited cash means, but accepted as preferable to communal works. It was intended to use council revenue to purchase materials and, depending on the nature of the project, to use either paid or voluntary labour.

The attempted use of voluntary labour was one of the chief barriers to acceptance of the new local government system in the first two years of its operation. While there were few objections to fulfilling customary obligations, projects like the building of causeways across tidal passages were regarded, as under the earlier system, as "for the government". Many accepted the opportunity to opt out, thus causing friction with those who were prepared to offer their services. Dissension was further exacerbated by attempts at coercion by some of the new councils. In an effort to rectify the situation, a draft by-law was prepared enabling compulsion for "minor communal services" as defined and permitted by the International Labour Organization.[13] The by-law was adopted by most islands in 1968–9. The position has improved somewhat since then but protests have been voiced on many islands to the effect that the by-law represents a breach of faith as the "basic rate" was intended to render community service unnecessary. The argument that the by-law was passed by the Island Council, composed of the elected representatives of the people of the island, has little effect.

Initially the Island Councils experienced some difficulty in understanding the new system of grants and loans which, along with a rebate on copra production, replaced subventions from the Colony Government.[14] With assistance from district officers in drawing up annual estimates the position has improved considerably and the list of development and building projects completed or in progress is an impressive one. Large numbers of classrooms, clinics, staff houses and local government buildings have been constructed with aid received from Colonial Development and Welfare Schemes and government grants as well as local contributions. Roads and causeways have been enlarged or constructed to cater for trucks, and for buses on the three

[13] Article 2 of Convention 29.

[14] The Copra Rebate Scheme, which allowed a rebate of half the average copra export duty (20 per cent f.o.b.) paid for each ton of copra produced in excess of an island target figure, proved unsatisfactory and was terminated in May 1969.

islands where a transport service has been introduced. Local financial contributions have varied depending on the nature of the projects and the government's willingness or ability to subsidise council efforts. A significant factor in the capital development evident on the outer islands has been the posting of staff from the public works department and volunteers from United Kingdom or New Zealand agencies to outer islands as project supervisors. Inevitably, less popular projects, especially causeways, have fallen behind schedule, or occasionally been abandoned, but this does not detract from the overall achievement. On some islands plans have been drawn up with the aid of Colony staff with the aim of co-ordinating development.

With the growing appreciation of the local government structure has come a desire on the part of most councils to perform greater deeds and accept increased responsibilities. Problems of finance have remained, however, and there has been a marked reluctance on the part of councils to increase the basic rates, which average about $2·50 in the Gilberts and $2 in the Ellice for men, and slightly less for women and therefore additional sources of revenue have been sought. In particular, contributions have been solicited from those engaged in wage employment away from their home islands. Usually remittances are sent to relatives on "home" islands but community leaders have often sought to channel some of them into funds for church or island projects. At Makin, for example, in 1969 the Island Council attempted to levy a tax of $1 per month on all persons from the island employed at Ocean Island. When it was realised that the tax would not have legal sanction the Council considered raising the funds by a special rate.

More common, perhaps, are collections on the islands themselves for special projects. Such "donations" are usually on a per capita basis and collected at public meetings where non-payers can be noticed. On Maiana, in 1967, when the council ran short of funds, it was decided that all taxpayers would contribute $10 and that there would be no "voluntary service" on the island in 1968. All, with three exceptions, met the initial demand but there was later cause for concern when religious dissensions became evident and reprisals were taken against those who refused to meet a further demand of $1. At Onotoa, in 1968, when council revenue was over-estimated an approach was made to the old men who agreed that the sum of $1100 that had been collected for educational purposes should be handed to the council and that the remaining deficit should be met by a levy of $2·41 per tax-payer.

These few examples make clear the powerful position still held by the *unimane* on most Gilbert Islands. On Nonouti their position has been formalized in an association which has dominated the Island Council since the latter's inception in April 1967.

When the 75th anniversary of the arrival of the Sacred Heart Mission in the Gilberts was held at Nonouti in September 1964, Catholics and Protestants joined to provide hospitality and entertainment for visitors from all over the group. Such co-operation was unusual in the Gilberts and it was decided that an annual celebration should be held. The *Reitaki n Nonouti* (Union of Nonouti People) thus came into being in September 1965 at an island gathering attended by leaders of both churches and their followers. Membership of

the *Reitaki* was confined to heads of families, but attendance of all persons at annual meetings was regarded as obligatory. At this first meeting a contribution of $1 per member was collected with donations for the island totalling $363.[15]

Organizations for the collection of funds for community projects have always been common in the Ellice and southern Gilberts and are usually dominated by the old men, who preferred this type of informal influence to service on government bodies. The *Reitaki*, however, differed from the usual pattern in many ways. For the first two years of its existence the *Reitaki* confined its activities to fund raising on Nonouti and to serving as a forum for the discussion of island affairs. Even at this early stage authoritarian elements were evident, especially in the *Reitaki* "laws" which stipulated compulsory attendance at the annual meeting with a $6 fine for non-attendance. Within two years the powers of the *Reitaki* committee had expanded considerably with the *unimane* deciding, for example, which men were to be recruited for employment in the phosphate industry. With the advent of the Island Council in 1967 the *Reitaki* took on a more political complexion. Contributions had previously only been collected on the island itself but a desire to develop the island led to requests for donations from men working away from Nonouti. In 1967 and 1968 more than $3500 was received from Nauru and over $500 from Ocean Island. During the same period the *Reitaki* gave the Island Council $3400 towards the cost of a bus for the island. The balance of *Reitaki* funds, amounting to some $3000 was earmarked for the construction of an island hospital in 1968–9. The Island Council was persuaded by the district officer that a local government building should have priority. The *Reitaki* declined to make a donation for this purpose and the council has since experienced difficulty in raising the necessary funds, resulting in a delay before the hospital can be built.

From late 1967 the *Reitaki*, and in particular its committee of village representatives, was the effective government of the island, with the Island Council and Co-operative Society Committee generally accepting its decisions. Apparently the government did not appreciate the full significance of the *Reitaki* at this stage regarding it, with its subsidiary committees on Tarawa, Ocean Island and Nauru, simply as a fund-raising organization and an excellent example of ecumenical co-operation.

It was not until religious rivalries finally came to a head in May 1969, with a dispute over Island Council assistance to denominational schools, that the extent of the association's power became obvious. The *Reitaki* was damned as a "protestant device" by the priest resident on the island and approximately 100 Roman Catholic members withdrew. In an attempt to enforce its decisions the *Reitaki* ordered the dismissal of all non-members from Council and Co-operative Society positions and the committee also considered legislating to prevent the recalcitrant minority from using the bus and the causeway that had been built under *Reitaki* supervision. Firm action was taken by the administration. Those dismissed were reinstated and

[15] Information on the *Reitaki* was collected in the course of a visit to the island in September 1969.

compensated but the power of the *Reitaki*, although slightly dented, has remained virtually intact. In September 1969 all island councillors were members of the *Reitaki*, and the *unimane*, convinced that their work was for the benefit of all Nonouti people, were seeking other methods of reaffirming their authority.

The significance of the *Reitaki n Nonouti* lies in its being the best example of the survival of traditional authority in the southern Gilbert Islands. Activities not directly controlled by the central administration through the "native governments", and not the prerogative of the church, had traditionally been their preserve. That an old men's association could gain such dominance on the island not only indicates the degree to which traditional authority has survived through more than three-quarters of a century of expatriate administration but also reveals certain attitudes towards the new Island Councils. Although the councils are acknowledged to have certain responsibilities, and are regarded as the *agencies* through which development should take place (even if only because this is required by government), a more basic responsibility for the collection of funds is seen to rest with "the people" through informal community organizations rather than through elected councils.

In addition to the obvious influence exercised by the old men in the southern Gilberts there have been interesting survivals of traditional authority on some of the northern and central islands previously governed under a chiefly system. At Butaritari, for example, members of the old royal family hold prominent offices in local government bodies and exercise considerable influence in non-Council affairs.

The present high chief of Abemama has settled in the Solomon Islands leaving his son as the effective office holder. As well as the personal lands owned by the members of the "royal family" there are in the region of 150 lands still regarded as being the property of the person holding the office of *uea*, or high chief.[16] The traditional social organization with its division into slaves and land-owning aristocrats has persisted, in a modified form, to the present day. The result is a large number of families dependent on the *uea* for land and therefore livelihood. The present incumbent exercises an informal suzerainty over his "tenants", charging no fixed rents but expecting periodic gifts, usually solicited, in lieu. With increasing dependence on cash, and therefore copra, the *uea's* position has been reinforced in recent years. He is the elected President of the Island Council, combines this position with that of high chief and, despite occasional rifts in the royal family or murmurings from tenants who consider his demands excessive, he is undoubtedly the most powerful man on the island.

While the Ellice Islands have experienced difficulties in the executive branch, some of the more serious problems evident in the Gilberts have not been present. The communities are smaller (with only a few hundred on each island) and, with few exceptions, belong to the same church. On most islands educational development has been the result of co-operation between Island Councils and the missions with schools being merged into single units. Although the original Island Funds were absorbed into Protectorate revenue

[16] *Lands Register*, Abemama Lands Court.

in 1914 the principle of an island account has been retained; some of the islands have several thousand dollars invested in the Colony or overseas, thus providing a potential source of funds for development. Women in the Ellice Islands play a more significant role in island affairs than their counterparts in the Gilberts. Community organizations have been particularly concerned with maternal welfare clinics and village hygiene, and with raising funds by the sale of handicrafts. There is evidence of a strong community feeling in the Ellice expressed in a willingness to provide labour and materials for island projects. A degree of disillusionment has been evident in recent years, however, but directed at the central rather than the local government. In part it has been derived from delays of several months in the delivery of stores and materials ordered from Tarawa. The current air of dissatisfaction among the Ellice Islanders is also closely tied to uncertainty regarding their future political status as a minority group and fears for civil service employment and educational opportunities for their children.

The separation of the judicial and executive branches of the island administration was the primary object of the 1966 revision. The Island courts were to become part of the Colony's judicial structure and for this reason it was decided that all fines from the courts would be paid to Colony funds – the source of all court expenses. The new courts met with many of the difficulties experienced by the Islands Councils, most being derived from inadequate explanation and training. From the outset the magistrates were expected to administer laws written only in English and the Island Courts Ordinance itself is still not available in the vernacular languages. Under such circumstances it was inevitable that the courts would be forced to rely heavily on their appointed clerks, who were in practice, but not necessarily, the Island executive officers. There have been cases of clerks exceeding their authority and more common instances of the courts acting outside their jurisdiction or imposing excessive fines and terms of imprisonment for first or trivial offences. Perhaps the main problems have been derived from the fact that the Colony's laws, by-laws and legal procedures have become increasingly sophisticated, making the often rough and ready justice of earlier days less acceptable.

Island Council by-laws also fall within the jurisdiction of the Island courts. There is no objection to this practice on the outer islands but constant requests have been made to the government supported by the staff of the district offices, for the fines from infringements against the by-laws to be paid to the Island Councils. The arguments that magistrates are paid from the centre, and that the courts are Colony courts, are not accepted by the Island Councils. They argue that fines from the old island regulations were always paid to local revenue and that the practice should continue. The situation as at December 1968 was summed up by the district commissioner for the Gilbert Islands:

> "The (Nonouti) Council brought up, as do nearly all councils, the sore and controversial question regarding the destination of court fines. It does not matter how good our reasons or how logical and valid our arguments, every council remains firmly convinced that

> it is just an unfair and petty meanness on our part to retain these fines".[17]

The administration has constantly refused to meet these requests, but the latest, in the form of a motion passed in the House of Representatives on 27 February 1970, will be difficult to resist unless the government is prepared to undermine the status of the House by declining to accept its recommendations or by the granting of court fines to the councils in return for some other charge, for example a portion of court members' salaries.

By early 1968 it was clear that serious problems as discussed above, existed in local government and discussions were held among senior civil servants in April of that year. The generally accepted view was that the prime cause was to be found in the lack of understanding of the new system on the outer islands rather than in the legislation itself.[18] The Government declared that:

> "Nothing has emerged in the course of experience or discussion to suggest that the system of local government introduced by Ordinance No. 5 of 1966 is unsound or generally unsuited to local conditions . . . There is much evidence from all quarters to suggest that, despite preliminary public debate and discussion, understanding of the principles of local government has not been achieved either within the structure of the system or at public level".[19]

Immediate steps were taken to find a solution to the problems arising from the abolition of communal works and, later in the year, to the problems caused by the replacement of the old island police forces. Detachments of Colony police on outer islands were inevitably small and inadequate to meet the demands of the situation. Police officers had little time or inclination to deal with petty infringements and were particularly hampered by their being "strangers" on the islands to which they were posted. A satisfactory solution has been found in the appointment of village wardens, the old island police under a new name, by the Island Councils to share the burden of law enforcement with the Colony police.

A more comprehensive reappraisal of local government was made in mid-1969, initiated in part by a survey of Colony administration and development policy. Staff of the district offices, who are responsible for the supervision of local government, placed the blame for most problems firmly on failures in the executive branch. It was pointed out that most Island executive officers lacked the ability, education and training to carry out their allotted duties. The executive officer position was categorized as unpopular because of its low salary and because it involved service away from Tarawa. Other defects noted were the absence of trained subordinate clerks and the failure to train replacement staff.[20]

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[17] Tour Report, Nonouti, 9 December 1968, GEIC, G.I.D.O., 2nd Series, F34/4/10(III).
[18] Minutes of discussions on Local Government Development, 11 April 1968, loc. cit.
[19] Discussion Paper for Governing Council, Meeting 4/68, GEIC, Secretariat, 3rd Series, F113/1/1.
[20] D.C., G.I.D. to Assistant R.C., 19 May 1969, GEIC, G.I.D.O., 2nd Series, F29/3/21; *Memorandum on Local Government Policy*, July 1969, loc. cit.

The first priority on the list of suggested remedial measures was the establishment of a local government training school, under the aegis of the Gilbert Islands district office, to train new executive officers and subordinate staff, provide refresher courses for present officers and short courses for council presidents and vice-presidents.[21] By the end of 1970 the School had not been established but the government had stated an intention to include a local government section in a vocational training unit scheduled for 1971. In September 1969, following a civil service review, recommendations were put forward by the district commissioner, Gilbert Islands district, for an increase in Island executive officers' salaries by an average of 25 per cent.[22] Twelve months later the new rates had not been introduced.

VII

It has been accepted as axiomatic by colonial administrations in post-war years, at least in British territories, that constitutional developments designed to produce an ultimately self-governing state should be accompanied by a reciprocal growth of local government institutions. In theory the local government legislation in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony provides for such growth with the introduction of representative councils, with elected presidents and independent executive officers. Since 1962 it has been a stated aim of Government to devolve as much reponsibility as possible for island affairs upon Island Councils. In practice, however, there have been several limitations. One of the major problems faced by its local governments is the need to seek approval or confirmation for almost all decisions of any importance. In most cases district officers, those directly involved, are not empowered to make such decisions but must pass proposals on to higher authorities. By-laws passed by the Island Councils still require the sanction of the resident commissioner. Estimates, prepared annually by the councils with the assistance of district officers, must also meet with his approval. Because councillors and executive officers generally have little appreciation of the techniques of drafting, long and frustrating delays have resulted while district officers have been obliged to perform these tasks to the council's satisfaction before official action can be taken. By-laws must be processed in the Attorney-General's office and, with the estimates, must pass through the relevant section of the Colony Secretariat before final approval is given. In an attempt to obtain uniformity among the islands, model by-laws have been prepared in Tarawa and submitted to the councils for approval. Councils wishing to make amendments or to introduce additional laws have been faced with delays of up to twelve months before enactment has been possible. In practice, therefore, significant advantages which could be gained from decentralization – essential in the Colony's peculiar circumstances – are lost by a combination of communications difficulties and centralised controls.

Although the 1966 Ordinance radically increased the responsibilities of the island governments without adequate investigation of the ability of their human financial resources to support rapid developments, the position is not

[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *A Review of the Salaries and Structure of the Local Government Service*, GEIC, G.I.D.O., 18 September 1969.

irretrievable. Despite delays and minor problems which will inevitably continue, there is no reason to believe that the present local government system cannot be made to function satisfactorily provided remedial measures are implemented. With experience Island Courts should improve and the proposed training school for Island Executive Officers should revitalize local government. Village and island rivalries are already stimulating development, especially in the educational field, and the expansion of agricultural co-operatives can be expected to boost cash income as well as the Colony's copra output. Close supervision at all levels will be necessary, however, if current policies are to have any chance of success.

Constitutionally, the Colony was due to progress to a "member system" with the Legislative Council and an Executive Council early in 1971. The prospects for local government after the granting of internal self-government, expected in about 1976, should therefore be examined. First, and most important, approximately half of the Colony's revenue will disappear with the last of the Ocean Island phosphates in about six years' time and the Colony, whatever its political status, will be unable to provide from its own resources either the funds or the skilled personnel to support an administration on the current scale. The present structure tends to be top-heavy and there is considerable duplication of functions; this is particularly evident in the field of local government.

The wisdom of a policy which will further increase the responsibilities of the Island Councils must be doubted, therefore, and a reversal considered. While it is definitely desirable to insist on local contributions towards island development projects (especially buildings and equipment) in order to emphasise the close relationship between local taxation and local development, and to boost the status of the Island Councils, there appears to be little point in asking the Councils to subsidise the salaries of Colony staff on their islands in return for nominal benefits. Education and medical services would be more efficient if the Colony Government were to acknowledge them as its full responsibility and meet all the implied obligations regarding personnel and finance, and administer them from the centre.

The Gilbert Islands district office, and its partner in the Ellice Islands, are primarily concerned with the supervision and control of local government affairs. It therefore seems pointless to allow close supervision of the activities of the district staff from the central administration in general and the Colony Secretariat in particular. The staff from the central offices seldom see the outer islands and then only on brief tours which are of extremely limited value. Controls exercised by the secretariat and the resident commissioner tend to undermine the status of the councils (and the status of the district officers with the councils) and prevent the growth of any concept of autonomy. A more rational approach would be to convert the district offices into a department of local government which would have the final responsibility for by-laws and island estimates, would supervise local government staff, organise training and be the major policy-making body for local government. Such a development would allow full responsibility for health and education matters to revert to the appropriate departments. The scheme would also have the advantage of simplifying and streamlining procedures generally,

and thus reduce delays. Most important, such a local government department would be better suited to the conditions which will prevail with the advent of self-government.

Excluding urban Tarawa, with its population in excess of 9,500 for which special arrangements are being planned, the Colony now has 26 local government bodies for approximately 42,000 people.[23] Geography demands a large number of administrative units but to grant them responsibility for more than purely local affairs will result in duplication, delays and an inevitable loss of efficiency – luxuries which the Colony can ill afford.

Abbreviations used in Footnotes

CO 225	– Colonial Office, Original Correspondence, Series 225
D.C.	– District Commissioner
D.O.	– District Officer
E.I.D.	– Ellice Islands District
GEIC	– Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony
G.I.D.	– Gilbert Islands District
G.I.D.O.	– Gilbert Islands District Office
H.C.	– High Commissioner for the Western Pacific
LMS	– London Missionary Society
O.I.D.	– Ocean Island District
R.C.	– Resident Commissioner
S. of S.	– Secretary of State
Sec. to Govt.	– Secretary to Government, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony
WPHC	– Western Pacific High Commission

Note

All documents with a 'WPHC' reference are located at the Central Archives of Fiji and the Western Pacific High Commission in Suva, Fiji. Unless otherwise stated all 'GEIC' documents are located in the appropriate office or department in Tarawa, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. The CO 225 series and the records of the London Missionary Society were consulted on microfilm at the National Library of Australia, Canberra.

[23] The post-war expansion of the administration in the three 'urban' centres of South Tarawa, – Betio, Bairiki and Bikenibeu – the development of a commercial area, and the recent removal of controls on movement within the Colony have caused a rapid growth in Tarawa's population in the past decade. (Between 1963 and 1968 the population of South Tarawa increased from 9,000 to over 10,000 and now has approximately 18 per cent of the Colony's total). Except for an appointed council for the islet of Betio, South Tarawa has not had any formal local government since 1958 – a situation that the Government is currently taking steps to remedy.

Northern Nigerian Managers

An example of an African Commercial Elite.

By BRIAN H. A. RANSON*

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TODAY, over much of the continent, Africans are holding key positions in the administrative, educational and political structure of their countries. As Africa continues to move from subsistence and barter to commerce and industry a new category of indigenous élite is emerging whose members perform managerial functions in the monetized sector of the economy. Development has not everywhere proceeded at the same pace or along the same lines.

A comparison of the contributions to the *International Social Science Bulletin* (Vol. 8, No. 3, 1956) with those to Lloyd, P. C. (ed.), *The New Elites of Tropical Africa* (1966) makes this clear. Over most of Africa the "take-over" started in the politico-administrative sphere and only later impinged upon the commercial sphere. Thus Mercier (1956) could remark of Senegal " . . . the group to which the name 'commercial bourgeoisie' has been given is still too small to have much influence, almost all African traders are small shopkeepers and make no appreciable impact on the affairs of the community as a whole,"[1] whilst Lloyd could write generally that . . . "Commerce and business have had little attraction hitherto for the educated African . . . The University graduate rarely has any capital to invest in business and is not likely to spend lean years building up his enterprise when the immediate rewards of salaried employment are so high."[2]

Where other avenues to African advancement have been blocked, however, as in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, then commerce has appeared more attractive and educated persons have been attracted to it.[3] In West Africa, however, until quite recently commerce offered very little attraction to qualified Africans. On the one hand prospects of promotion in the large

* This paper is based mainly on a joint study of career patterns and social backgrounds of Nigerian managers conducted in 1968 by M. J. Greaves and the author when both were on the teaching staff at the Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University. Mr. Greaves has since moved to the University, Nairobi where he is lecturing and the author has moved to the University of Papua and New Guinea, so a joint analysis of the results of the survey has been difficult to achieve. The author accepts responsibility for any shortcomings in this article and at the same time expresses his gratitude to Mr. Greaves for his help and assistance. The author is also grateful to Dr. C. L. Hunt and Dr. P. C. Lloyd for their helpful comments on this paper.

1 P. Mercier, in *International Social Science Bulletin*, (Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 441-452).

2 See P. C. Lloyd, in *The New Elites of Tropical Africa*, (O.U.P., 1966) p. 8.

3 The same may be true of Portuguese territories of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique (see Moreira (1956)) but I am uncertain.

expatriate firms were slight, on the other many Africans had a personal preference for government service. Smythe and Smythe remarked upon ". . . the general tendency to underplay business successes,"[4] and they further suggested that "Once education was completed, circumstances dictated an almost natural gravitation of educated young people toward public life."[5]

Studies of the élite therefore, have quite rightly concentrated on persons in the politico-administrative and educational spheres who are both wealthy and well educated, and who enjoy a certain distinctive style of life. In the commercial sphere Africans have only recently been able to reach top level of management in countries like Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and even now there are still many Europeans in the higher ranks of the great trading companies. Kumalo points out that in 1961 "Top management in nearly all Companies operating in East Africa was still in the hands of non-Africans, both expatriate and local."[6] In Uganda, Africans were then, to use his term, 'budding bureaucrats' occupying middle and lower management positions. However, by 1966 some East Africans had been appointed to top management positions, although the numbers were less than on the West Coast.

Jones focussed upon another kind of commercial élite when he discussed the commercial farmers of Zambia. These were essentially 'self made men', comparable in certain respects to the more successful indigenous business men of West Africa. They lacked the education and western sophistication of the true élite. Leith-Ross and van der Vaeren-Aguessy have drawn attention to the prominent roles played by women traders and Little has touched upon the same topic. However, it seems to the writer that prominent market traders have little in common with the true élite, except possession of money, and it is clear that educationally they fall far below civil servants and educationalists. Their style of life is also very different. The dividing line between 'market trader' and 'indigenous businessman' is however, not at all easy to draw, and it must be conceded that the wealthier traders do have some claims for inclusion in the commercial élite. This is particularly so, when we realize that the formal qualifications of the commercial 'élite' are generally lower than those in the political and administrative fields.

The tendency to equate élite status with advanced education is one explanation for the comparative neglect of the study of business managers. Another factor is the difficulty of identifying and locating this group. It is far easier to visit government departments or call at universities and teacher training colleges and interview the educated élite than it is to track down the prominent men in commerce. There is therefore far less known about managers in Africa than is known about civil servants, university students or teachers. For this reason it was decided to make a preliminary survey of managers working in the northern part of Nigeria.

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[4] See H. H. Smythe and M. Smythe *The New Nigerian Elite* (Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 12.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 72.
[6] See Kumalo in *The New Elites in Tropical Africa* (O.U.P. 1966), p. 216.

Introduction

One of the first problems that had to be faced was to identify and locate managers. It was not sufficient simply to look for persons designated as managers since this was no guarantee that they really performed managerial functions, and conversely there were other individuals lacking the title "manager" who nonetheless performed these functions.[7] The concern was to find men who had responsibility for making important decisions influencing the firms' organization and policy in the particular localities where they worked.

Whilst it was simple to locate the larger firms who employed indigenous managers, the selection and evaluation of smaller firms was a much greater problem. For this reason it was necessary to take a selective sample of managers from four large towns in the North – Kano, Kaduna, Jos and Zaria.[8] Within these towns, the sample was selected by including:

1. All Nigerian managers from all manufacturing companies with over 200 employees listed in the *Industrial Directory* (Federal Ministry of Information 1965).

2. All Nigerian managers in public corporations and in selling and service companies who were listed in the town telephone directories.[9]

Having drawn the sample of firms, letters were sent to the Head of the firm or corporation in each town explaining the purpose of the survey, enclosing a sample questionnaire and requesting co-operation in permitting his managers to help the study. About a week later a personal call was made on these senior men by the organizers to elaborate further on the objectives and to distribute copies of the questionnaire to individual managers. Questionnaires were numbered so that particular firms could be recognized, but individuals themselves were not identified. Stamped addressed envelopes were attached. Two to three weeks later undergraduate assistants visited the firms, replaced lost questionnaires and reassured managers about the intention of the survey.[10] When the completed questionnaires were received, the data was transferred to punch cards and processed using an ICT sorter and tabulator.

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[7] Thus, there were persons styled 'manager' who were effectively small traders or petrol station attendants and others styled 'supervisor' who clearly performed managerial functions.

[8] The mere fact of making this sort of selection has sociological significance, and it is felt that there may well be important differences between managers in our sample and those operating in relatively isolated locations in the North. In the more isolated areas it would seem that membership of the local tribe was a considerable advantage and ability to speak the local language often a necessity – in the urban centres these factors were important but not crucially so.

[9] If a person was listed in the telephone directories but no longer working for the firm or corporation, his replacement was included if he also was a Nigerian. Further, any other Nigerian managers in a firm who had not been listed in the telephone directories were also contacted. Thus our sample failed to include people from those firms who had no Nigerian managers in the telephone directories at date of publication.

[10] The visits of the under-graduate assistants increased the response rate from approximately 25 per cent to just over 50 per cent.

Research Findings: General Characteristics

The sample included 166 managers of whom rather less than half came from selling and service firms, and about a quarter each from government corporations and manufacturing firms. Understandably therefore, the largest concentration of managers, roughly a fifth, worked in sales, marketing and advertising departments whilst rather less than a fifth were in finance and accounting. Next in importance were production and works followed by general administration: less than ten were in personnel and training and in purchasing and stores. All other departments accounted for a further fifth.

Although the men were all working in the Northern States of Nigeria, they came from diverse backgrounds. Sixty-seven hailed from outside the old Northern Region and a further forty-three from Kwara and Benue-Plateau States. Only a third came from the dry North (North-East, North-Central, North-West and Kano States) whereas the Yoruba from the West contributed nearly half. This is significant, for whilst in the pre-1966 period it had been gradually acceptable to employ any Northerner to work in the old Northern Region, at the time that the survey was made (April, 1968) it was felt by many company directors and personnel managers that it was more desirable to recruit and employ men only in their States of origin. In particular, there was a growing desire among those responsible for firms' recruitment and training programmes to get hold of more 'dry' Northerners, Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, etc. to work in these areas since there was evidence of less willingness by the local people (employees and populace) to accept non-indigenes. By April, 1968, there were no longer any Ibos working in these areas of the North although there were nine managers from other tribes from the Mid-west, S.E. and Rivers States. Whilst, in general, most firms and most managers endorsed the feeling that 'Nigerianization' was a necessary trend, there was no longer a feeling that 'northernization' as such was an adequate adjustment for ethnic feeling. Residence in the former Northern Region no longer made distant or culturally divergent Nigerians acceptable. Hence, if qualified "dry" Northerners were unobtainable, expatriates were sometimes preferred to other qualified Nigerians.

Religious affiliation showed a close relationship to tribal membership. Thus most Hausa, Fulani and far Northerners were Muslims (44 of 47), most Yorubas were Christian (56 of 76). All those from the Mid-West, S.E. and Rivers States were Christians, but the Middlebelters[11] numbered seventeen Christians and ten Muslims.

The managers themselves were young to middle-aged men. The bulk (111) were between 25-39 years and, of the remainder, 27 were between 40-49.[12] About half the sample had received a post-primary education and nearly a third more had progressed beyond secondary school.[13] Very few, however, had received much in the way of formal managerial training. Nearly three-quarters had received no managerial training and, of the rest,

[11] Tiv, Idoma, Igala, etc.

[12] Information was available only on the ages of 149 of the sample of 166.

[13] For further discussion on the problems of education and training see Groves and Hunt in *Management in Nigeria* (Vol. 4, No. 5) (1969) pp. 165-8 and M. J. Greaves in *New Nigerian* (26 November 1968).

only sixteen had attended managerial courses run by their own firms in Nigeria, only a dozen had attended managerial courses organized by Nigerian institutions and only four held degrees or diplomas in management from Nigerian Universities. Additionally, some six men had attended managerial courses run by their firms or other institutions abroad.

In terms of 'on the job' experience, however, the picture was somewhat different although accurate data was only available for about two-thirds of the sample. Again few men had very great experience; 28 had between 5-10 years' and a further 28 had had between 1½-5 years'. Significantly 26 men had been managers for less than 1½ years – a figure which almost certainly reflected the need for management replacement after the October 1966 disturbances.

Nearly half of the managers earned between £500-£1,000 p.a., but the bulk of the rest earned more, 34 men making £1,000-£1,500 p.a. and 24 men £1,500-£2,000. Eight men earned £2,000 or more, and only sixteen less than £500. Managers were thus comparatively wealthy by local standards.

Family Background

The great majority of the men were married, and among them most had formed monogamous unions. Among the married men, just over half had four or more children. Surprisingly enough, for West Africa, the managers did not claim to have to support many dependants. Nearly half of the men in the sample supported only 1-5 people, and of the remainder most supported from 6-10.[14]

Interestingly enough nearly a quarter of the men had no dependants living with them, and more than half had only 1-5. How then should this pattern of family life be explained? Traditionally, influential men kept large compounds and were surrounded by many relatives but the Nigerian managers had mostly broken from this pattern and were living in much smaller households. Was it their geographical mobility which dictated this pattern of life, or were there other factors operating as well? Was there in fact one common pattern of family interaction, or several different patterns?

Writing of the Yoruba of Western Nigeria, Lloyd suggests "Among the élite one may detect a variety in the pattern of family relationships, ranging between a traditional pattern in which the wife is to a large extent economically independent of her husband, a Victorian pattern with an authoritarian father and greater emphasis on the individual, an egalitarian pattern with an emphasis on separate roles and responsibilities between husband and wife."[15] Discussion with students at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria led me to recognize virtually the same categories: (i) modified-traditional (ii) Victorian model (often with Christian beliefs acting as an important guide to social conduct) and (iii) West African compromise (largely egalitarian but with the husband still permitted greater freedom than in typical European unions).

[14] Responses here were confusing, since some men included their wives and children as dependants, others did not. Some included persons to whom they occasionally gave cash, others only those to whom regular support was given.

[15] *op. cit.*, p. 329.

Additionally in the North, it was necessary to recognize a further category of Islamic unions where Koranic teachings provided an important guide for social behaviour. The significance of this is that no one pattern of family life characterized Nigerian managers so that in the domestic sphere considerable variation in life-style was possible.

Variation occurred not only in the relationship between husband and wife but also the pattern of inter-relationships amongst the wider kin group. Interaction with a wider kin group was apparently restricted to ceremonial occasions for most of the managers. The majority lived a hundred miles or more from parents or siblings and, although they reported having seen them at least once in the previous six months, this could be due to the Christmas and Ramadhan festivals falling in this period. The minority who had relatives living in the same town were likely to have seen them in the preceding 24 hours.

Explanations for this pattern of interaction are not hard to find. Marris showed that for many people in Lagos, the intensity of inter-action among kin was closely related to geographical propinquity,[16] whilst Mayer demonstrated that traditional or modern orientation was a more significant variable.[17] Outside Africa, Wilmott and Young's study of Woodford showed that where parents and children belong to the same social class, and the males concerned follow similar types of occupation, parent-child links tend to be better preserved and communication tends to be easier than in those cases where parents and children belong to different classes and follow dissimilar life styles.[18] We might therefore expect that type of family background would influence the pattern of interaction between managers and kin in Africa also.

There are a number of interesting observations that can be made in this regard. Few managers came from homes where their fathers were engaged in occupations which required professional or semi-professional skills, and few from homes where their fathers were engaged in supervisory or clerical work. Many had fathers who were farmers or traders, and few had fathers who were manual workers or who engaged in traditional or religious pursuits. The managers' mothers were likely to have been either housewives or traders.

In terms of education, the parental pattern was again very different from their sons'. Over half the managers' mothers and nearly a quarter of their fathers had received no education. A further quarter of their mothers and fathers had received only Koranic instruction, and a few of their parents were self-taught. About a fifth of the fathers had received a primary education but very few of the mothers had achieved even this standard. Very few parents had received any post-primary education and only four fathers had proceeded further than this in formal education. Thus the overall pattern was one where managers were better educated and following a radically different occupational pursuit from their parents.

16 See P. Marris, *Family and Social Change in an African City* (Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1961), esp. pp. 148.

17 See P. Mayer, *Townsman or Tribesman* (OUP, 1961). Mayer showed that family ties were more important to the 'Red' (the traditionally minded Xhosa) than to the 'School' or 'True Townsmen' (the westernized Xhosa).

18 See Wilmott and Young. *Family and Class in a London Suburb* (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1960).

The corollary to this would seem to be that they would also follow a radically different style of life, but in fact this was not quite true. Work and leisure had become separate for them and the norms operating in one situation were not necessarily the same as those operating in the other. As in other countries, a manager might well mingle comfortably with his colleagues at work or at a smart hotel, yet still be able to switch roles when he visited an aged mother in his home village. Writing of the West African élite in general, Little suggested "The people with whom the senior civil servant drives in his car or drinks at his club are likely to be as well educated as himself, but the likelihood also is his home accommodates one or more of his wife's barely literate relatives. And the prosperous cocoa farmer or produce buyer with an income of over £2,000 a year has no scruples about sitting down to a meal with the men who work for him."

This would certainly be largely true of managers in Northern Nigeria. There are few local bars and eating houses, so much entertainment is carried on in the better hotels. The contrast between these surroundings and those of a manager's home could be very great. The author recollects drinking with his colleague and a graduate trainee-manager at Hill Station, Jos. Here the manager was completely at ease, and when the evening finished, we drove him back to his quarters which consisted of a single room in a very modest part of town. He was a bachelor and explained that his firm did not provide accommodation. At an earlier period of training in Lagos he mentioned sharing a room with a friend and sleeping on a mattress on the floor. How typical this is, it is not possible to say, but there is a great difference in the style of domestic life of those whose jobs carry quarters and those who do not get them provided. This is one reason for the attraction of government positions which carry with them superior furnished housing. However this factor of residence meant that some at least of the managers were living very close to ordinary working people and were very aware of the day-to-day problems of urban living. Many however, were finding a deep contrast between relationships with colleagues at work and relationships with their wives at home. This was to be observed in the different attitudes exhibited by managers towards their wives in public and in private, and would seem to relate to the education and sophistication of the women folk involved.

Smythe and Smythe remark about this when they note "Since wives of the élite in general are far behind their husbands in education and poise, there is little the latter can discuss with them beyond the routine of daily home problems. Their husbands' rise to eminence calls for them to perform new and strange functions for which they have had no preparation. Foreign visitors in the home marvel at the speed with which wives fade into the background after being introduced, leaving refreshments to be served by stewards."[19]

Like their mothers, managers' wives were still likely to be housewives but probably some of them would interpret this role in a different manner from the senior generation. About a sixth of the wives worked at jobs that required professional or slight professional skill whilst a few were employed in super-

[19] *op. cit.* pp. 96-97.

visory or clerical jobs. Only about an eighth were engaged in trade. Wives were likely to be better educated than the managers' parents but less educated than the managers themselves. Between a third and half of them had received a primary education and a further fifth had attended a secondary or a post-primary institution. A few had proceeded beyond the secondary stage.

More men married women from their own tribe than from outside, although there were important differences among the tribes here. Whilst most Yoruba married homogamously with respect to tribe, only about two thirds of the Hausa, Fulani and far Northerners took spouses from their own tribes, and about a third married strangers. Middlebelters followed the Hausa-Fulani pattern, but men from the S.E. and Rivers States tended to marry homogamously.

Most men reported that their wives lived in the same compound as themselves and over two thirds reported seeing their wives in the last 24 hours. However, 22 reported that their wives were separated from them (in the sense that they were not living in the same geographical location).[20] Many men were mobile and this took them away from their family and home town. Where they settled, they adopted a style of life very different from that of their parents. When it is remembered that most managers earned £500-£1,000 p.a., whilst an unskilled labourer made only £150 p.a. and a farmer perhaps £30-£40, the economic base for the difference in life-style is obvious.

Social Activities

For their entertainment of relatives and social and business friends, managers differed sharply in their choice of location. Whilst the majority preferred to entertain relatives in their own houses, only a fifth said they would choose to ask their social friends back home and very few suggested that they would invite business friends home.[21] Most managers showed preference for entertaining their social friends in small hotels, clubs, bars, or restaurants; significantly only a few would choose very smart hotels (the reason for this may well be not the cost as much as the formality involved). About half the sample, however, preferred the smartest hotels for their business guests, and for nearly a third the choice lay with the smaller hotels, clubs, bars and restaurants.

Given this general reluctance to entertain at home, it is interesting to discover how managers wished their wives to behave when they did bring friends back to the house. Most stated that they preferred their wives to sit and talk with their friends, but a fifth were happier for their wives to serve drinks and then to withdraw while a small minority preferred them to remain in their quarters throughout. Again, when asked how they would react to an

[20] The problem here was essentially one that a man might own a house in his home-town and his wife and children lived there. He would consider them as "living in his compound" yet he would be separated from them.

[21] This contrasts sharply with expatriate norms in West Africa where home entertainment is usually preferred and companies and government departments often paid entertainment allowances and/or servant wages. The attitude shown related to a variety of factors including type of residence, sophistication of wife, possession of western crockery and cutlery, knowledge of cooking, etc.

invitation to a cocktail party given by their managing director, two-thirds of the men indicated that they would prefer to come with their wives and the remainder suggested that they would prefer to come on their own. Of those preferring to bring their wives, the majority indicated that this was because they loved them, enjoyed their company, or felt that it was the proper thing to do. Of those who preferred to come alone most suggested this was for traditional or religious reasons or that they just felt it was more convenient. In general, it was clear that Christians were more likely than Muslims to bring their wives along to such a gathering, Muslim attitude being influenced by their interpretation of the teachings in the Koran with regard to women and alcohol.

Leisure Activities

Smythe and Smythe pointed out that "The inadequacy of outside leisure outlets gives the élite considerable time at home with their families."[22] Our survey showed exactly the same thing. For the managers as a whole, by far the most popular way of spending leisure time was with their families. A third spent more than twenty hours a week and over half more than ten hours a week with friends. Most men spent more time at church and mosque than they did at social clubs, bars, hotels or restaurants and there was little significant difference between Christians and Muslims in this regard.

Spending time at home meant sitting and chatting, listening to the radio or record-player, reading a newspaper or magazine or perhaps having a drink and a smoke. All those managers about whom we have information claimed to have read the *New Nigerian* (a local newspaper) during the preceding 24 hours and a fifth stated that they also had read a foreign newspaper during this period. Over a quarter claimed to have read a technical or professional journal as well and many more had seen a copy in the very recent past. Many managers had read other magazines in the past 24 hours, and just over a fifth had also read either the Bible or Koran. Even if, in some cases, these figures represent pious intentions rather than actual practices, they nonetheless indicate the great significance of newspapers and magazines in the leisure time activities of managers.

Most managers owned a radio and many also had radiograms, record-players, television sets and tape-recorders. Most had refrigerators and cars. Of the latter over half had vehicles in the £500-749 basic price[23] range and most of the remainder more expensive models.

Ownership of and interest in these sorts of consumer goods suggest that certain western values have been absorbed. Yet because these items are found in the home, it does not mean that this is the locus of westernized activities. Other factors point to a different contrast between work and home. For instance in the office most men preferred western dress, less than

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[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

[23] Basic price refers to United Kingdom basic price. Cost in Nigeria would range from about £750-1150 ex-showroom. Nobody with a car costing less than £1,000 (basic) wanted a cheaper model, although a few owners of cars costing more than this did so.

a quarter favouring the traditional gown and cap. At home, however, over half the men preferred to wear gowns and caps, less than a third favouring western dress.

There are a number of possible explanations for this besides the simple suggestion that men tend to see the office as a westernized situation and the home as traditional. Age may be significant here, as also may be the distinctive nature of the traditional dress worn. It is far easier to pick out a man's tribe when he is in traditional dress than when he wears a suit; and, for Yorubas in particular, this identification was not always desired. I know of one Yoruba, at least, who occasionally would wear a Hausa *riga* and cap.

However, if not at ease in western clothes all the time, the managers were certainly not all avid transitionalists. Their attendance at, and attitude towards, traditional ceremonies illustrate this. Whilst less than a third of the managers had attended a traditional ceremony in their home town during the previous year and nearly half the sample had not attended for three years or more, very few held unfavourable attitudes towards these practices, most regarding them as pleasant events. This needs to be interpreted somewhat carefully since it is not clear how much these occasions were pleasant because men saw old friends again, how far they were pleasant because they provided an admiring audience who appreciated the managers' achieved status, or how far they were emotionally satisfying in that they enabled relations with the traditional deities to be put on the right footing. I suspect the last reason was the least significant of all.

Conclusion

African 'take-over' of managerial positions in commerce is occurring now in West Africa. My impression is that this has proceeded further in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Southern Nigeria than it has in Northern Nigeria. It has proceeded further in West Africa than elsewhere in the sub-Saharan part of the continent, despite the early emergence of a commercially based élite in South and Central Africa. There is an urgent need for further studies to record the increasing development of an 'African commercial élite.'

The Northern Nigerian study suggests that not only has the commercial élite taken longer to emerge than the politico-administrative élite, but it is less well educated and in certain respects less distinctive in its life style. Despite their prominence as traders, we nowhere encountered women employed in managerial positions in Northern Nigeria. The men who held managerial positions tended generally to belong to the younger middle-aged category. They did not simply copy the attitudes and style of living of their expatriate predecessors. Many were fully at ease in Western situations, lived in Western style homes and worked in Western style offices. Yet most came from traditional rural backgrounds, took an interest in what was going on there and maintained some contact with their kinsfolk. Rather than "marginal men" torn between two cultures they appeared to be men, rooted in the traditional society, who had modified their behaviour to meet functional needs of business enterprise without losing their identification with the indigenous culture.

How Village Panchayats Take Decisions:

A Case Study from Uttar Pradesh.

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It is often possible to meet a particular need in several ways and to reach a decision on the one way chosen[1] calls for an evaluation of the alternatives that are available. This evaluation may be made on considerations such as suitability, cost, and benefits etc. from each of the available alternatives.[2]

Decision making may be viewed as a personal, group, community or national mechanism depending upon the focus of one's analysis. Although the basic postulates remain the same in all the cases, the actual functioning of the process becomes more complicated as it moves from the individual to the group to the community to the nation. Thus, in a social milieu one can find contrasting working of the decision making apparatus at various levels.

Objective of the Present Study

In recent years, Panchayati Raj has been a favourite topic for critics drawn from all walks of life. According to these critics, the Panchayati Raj institutions have become a hot-bed of party politics, have accentuated factionalism in the countryside and enabled the local leadership to use these bodies to further their personal and sectional ends.[3] Most of this criticism flows from a tendency to view the political apparatus of Panchayati Raj and political processes connected with its working from a non-political angle. It is needless to emphasize that the Panchayati Raj institutions are political institutions at the grass roots level and every political party worth the name would like to capture a local power base through these bodies. Political processes such as elections, and decision making have been creating factions since time im-

[1] The oldest classification of the stages involved in the decision making process is the one enunciated by Lasswell. According to him, seven stages namely intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal and termination have to be gone through before a decision can be taken: Lasswell, Harold D., *The Decision Making Process*: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, (Bureau of Government Research, Studies in Government, University of Maryland, 1956).

[2] This selection need not be always on rational grounds. In point of fact, studies of Dahl and Banfield suggest that more often the final choice is determined by political expediency than rational criteria. See, Dahl, Robert A., *Who Governs*? Democracy and Power in an American City, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961) and Banfield Edward C., *Political Influence*, (New York, Free Press, 1961).

[3] To have a glimpse of such criticism, see, for example, Jacob, George, (ed.), *Readings on Panchayati Raj*, (Hyderabad, NICD, 1967); Gaikwad, V. R., *Panchayati Raj and Bureaucracy*: A case study from Maharashtra, (Hyderabad, NICD, 1969); Mathur, M. V. and Iqbal Narain, (eds.), *Panchayati Raj, Planning and Democracy*, (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1969), and Haldipur, R. N. and V. R. K. Paramahamsa, (eds.) *Local Government Institutions in India*: Some Aspects, (Hyderabad, NICD, 1970).

memorial and it is hardly surprising that the Panchayati Raj elections and decision making have accentuated factionalism. Likely pressures on the system of Panchayati Raj were never given due consideration at the time of its introduction. They have come mainly from the existing politico-administrative system.[4] In consequence, the Panchayati Raj institutions have been undergoing structural changes.[5]

Available political analyses of the Panchayati Raj institutions indicate the successes and/or failures of these bodies.[6] But seldom any attempt is made to describe precisely the manner in which the political events take place. Crucial to the smooth functioning of these institutions is the manner in which decisions are reached on the various issues with which they have to deal, for upon them depends the success or failure of their programmes on the one hand and reactions that are likely to be seen in the social system on the other. The present case study has been conducted with these objectives in view.

The Locale

The analysis of this case study deals with Samastipur village Panchayat[7] in Barabanki district of Uttar Pradesh. Relevant details were compiled in the latter part of 1969.[8] The village Panchayat of Samastipur consists of three units: Samastipur, Bangawan and Chowdhry Ka Purwa. In terms of population, all three units are roughly of the same size. Samastipur and Bangawan form one revenue village; Chowdhry Ka Purwa forms another. There are 46 households in Samastipur, 42 in Bangawan and 43 in Chowdhry Ka Purwa. The dominant castes in Samastipur are the Brahmins and the Ahirs; in Bangawan the Mallahs (boatmen) and in Chowdhry Ka Purwa again the Ahirs. Apart from the *Pradhan* (chairman) and the *Up-Pradhan* (vice-chairman), the Panchayat has fifteen other *Panches* (members). Pandit Bindra Prasad, of Samastipur, is Pradhan and Bachchu Lal Ahir from Chowdhry Ka Purwa is Up-Pradhan. Of the fifteen Panches, five each are Ahirs and Mallahs, one each Gosain, Dhobi, and Pasi and the remaining two are Brahmins. Six of the Panches are from Samastipur, five from Bangawan and four from Chowdhry Ka Purwa.

Pradhan Bindra Prasad and Up-Pradhan Bachchu Lal are popular figures and have held these offices ever since the Panchayat was established. Apart from their personal characteristics which have contributed to their outstanding popularity, the village of Samastipur has a long tradition of settling disputes at the village level itself. The village economy is such that the interests of various sections of the village are inter-linked. The Chamar, Dhobi, Pasi

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[4] Even S. K. Dey, the man very much behind the introduction of Panchayati Raj system in India, has come to realize this. See, Dey, S. K., *Power to the People?* A Chronicle of India 1947-67, (Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1969).

[5] Abolition of Panchayat Samitis by the Punjab government and suspension of the Zilla Parishads by the Uttar Pradesh government are two recent examples. Even the Andhra Pradesh government is contemplating curtailment of the powers of the Panchayat Samitis.

[6] For a comprehensive bibliography, see Haldipur, R. N., and V. R. K. Paramahamsa, *op. cit.*

[7] Fictional names have been used for the village Panchayat and its office bearers.

[8] The help rendered by R. Kumar and L. R. Verma in the collection of data for this case study is very much appreciated.

and Mallah communities, for example, have to depend, to a large extent, upon the Ahirs and the Brahmins for their wherewithal since they do not have enough land. The soil in and around Samastipur is sandy and, excepting the farms on the extreme southern side of the village where partial irrigation is possible from the river Reth, there is no regular source of irrigation. Sinking of tube-wells is not only very arduous; it is also very costly. The main staple crops grown in Samastipur are millets, wheat, groundnuts, spices and, of course, vegetables. The Ahirs have also large herds of cattle and buffaloes.

The Issue: Khalihaan[9]

Consolidation of holdings was completed in Samastipur in 1965 and surprisingly there were very few disputes in regard to the allotment of new chaks (plots). However, one major difficulty which had arisen in the aftermath of the consolidation was that only one good Khalihaan existed. Although the consolidation officials had demarcated two others in Samastipur, they did not serve the purpose since the soil of these plots was too sandy for threshing and winnowing operations to be carried out. Every village, big or small, requires not one but several Khalihaans depending upon the acreage under the plough and the type of crops grown. Before consolidation, there existed two Khalihaans in Samastipur and one in Bangawan. Traditionally, each farmer has a clearly defined place in a Khalihaan for his crops and adjustments, if any, are made by mutual consent. It is not necessary that a farmer should bring all his crop after harvest to one single Khalihaan. This is decided by the nearness of the Khalihaan to the farms from which the crops have to be brought after harvest. In most cases, farmers use more than one Khalihaan.

The location of only one effective Khalihaan in Bangawan created a number of problems. Bangawan is situated roughly one kilometre to the east of Samastipur while the Samastipur farms are spread over a distance of two kilometres on the western side of the village. All the produce had now to be carried over to the only Khalihaan in Bangawan. There is only one cart-track and transportation of harvested crops to the Khalihaan, more especially from those farms which are distantly located from the cart-tracks, became very difficult. Since in most of such cases they had to be hauled up manually, the harvesting charges (in terms of grain) registered an appreciable increase.

In order to avoid manual transportation of harvested crops, those possessing bullock carts had lately evolved a new method. They started driving their carts through the harvested fields. These "seasonal" cart-tracks are used afterwards for disposing compost manure to different fields. However, such an operation is made difficult if one set of fields on the way is still unharvested. If the carts pass through standing crops, a lot of damage is caused. During 1968–69 a number of such cases occurred notably involving the large farm households. This was much resented by those whose crops were damaged since no compensation is paid.[10]

[9] Khalihaan is a demarcated open space where farmers store and then thresh and winnow their crops which are then taken home for consumption or for marketing.

[10] The cost and the slow process of litigation deter many would-be plaintiffs from taking civil action. Sometimes disputes arising from damage to crops are settled by arbitration at village level.

Acute overcrowding was also being experienced at the Bangawan Khalihaan. The entire crop which used to be threshed in three Khalihaans was now accumulated in one. The threshing operations in consequence took longer for the big farmers. In 1969, unexpected rain before the threshing and winnowing were over caused damage to the crops of Pradhan Bindra Prasad, Babu Lal Ahir and Pandit Ram Prasad. Then there was a dispute between Babu Lal Ahir of Samastipur and Darshan Mallah of Bangawan over the possession of their respective portions in the Khalihaan. As we were told by Darshan (and his version was corroborated by others including some from Samastipur), Babu Lal, being a big farmer, had occupied his portion. Since Darshan had also to finish his threshing and winnowing operations by the time others did, he threw harvested wheat and millet of Babu Lal onto a nearby farm and started his own threshing. This was enough provocation for Babu Lal to retaliate. He, in turn, dumped his crop on Darshan's and claimed that the entire lot belonged to him.

This dispute emphasized the need for more than one effective Khalihaan in Samastipur Panchayat. But now the immediate problem for Pradhan Bindra Prasad was to deal with this new development. The Mallahs were at one in their opinion that the trouble had been started by Babu Lal and that he should be held responsible for all that followed. On the other hand, Babu Lal felt that even if he might have occupied a little more space in the Khalihaan than he was entitled to, Darshan had no business to throw his crop onto the farm outside the Kahlihaan. The Pradhan like everyone else in the village, was anxious that a way out should be found to end this dispute before taking action over the problem of inadequate Khalihaan space.

While the dispute remained unresolved, a very unfortunate incident occurred. Someone threw a live butt of *Bidi*[11] without putting it out properly. The wind spread the sparks and in an hour or so a wild fire was raging. Before any preventive action could be taken, it assumed uncontrollable proportions. There are only two wells in Bangawan and hence the fire-fighting efforts were greatly hampered. The thatched houses fell easy prey to the fury of the fire and the whole village of Bangawan was reduced to ashes. Some head of cattle were also lost. A major portion of the Khalihaan was destroyed as well. However, there was no loss of human life.

Coming as it did in the peculiar background of the dispute between Babu Lal and Darshan, it was not entirely illogical to suspect some foul play. But in this case what was surprising to impartial observers was that each side accused the other of committing this "crime". Both sides had cogent arguments to offer. The residents of Bangawan, for example, stated that this was done to penalize the entire village. It was evident from the fact that all the houses in Bangawan were burnt. The people from Samastipur, on the other hand, argued that the fire was intended to destroy the crops of Samastipur farmers and the houses were burnt because the fire could not be controlled. Crop loss was heaviest in the case of Samastipur farmers.

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[11] Indigenous variant of the cigarette with *tendu* leaves used instead of paper as the wrapper.

The assessment by the revenue department of damage caused by natural calamities is likely to be completed in about four to five months and then another five or six months pass before tax relief and other loans are sanctioned. The Samastipur fire was no exception. Things were moving as they normally do. Pradhan Bindra Prasad knew that besides waiting for these formalities to be completed, the Panchayat had to solve the problem of the Khalihaan. In any case, in the eyes of the Pradhan, the two problems were not entirely unconnected.

A Panchayat meeting was summoned and ten out of fifteen Panches turned up. Four of the absent members were from Chowdhry Ka Purwa which was surely unaffected by the fire. The Panchayat, Bindra Prasad stated at the outset, had to consider, among other things, how to help Bangawan residents to put up thatched roofs again and to find two sites for the Khalihaans. The first proposition involved considerable help on the part of Chowdhry Ka Purwa and Samastipur residents in sparing material for making thatched roofs for the unfortunate victims of Bangawan by postponing replacement of their own thatchets. The outlook of Chowdhry Ka Purwa people, it was understood, was quite helpful and Up-Pradhan Bachchu Lal took personal responsibility to muster enough material for Bangawan. However, offers from Samastipur were not forthcoming. Pradhan Bindra Prasad had learnt, through past experience, that in such cases it is better to fix the quantum of help each family was required to give. If it was kept a little on the high side, people were expected to spare the material with a reasonable degree of goodwill. He, therefore, suggested that each family from Samastipur would have to provide material for at least one thatchet. There were protests from one or two members but there were others who said that this was fair enough. The Pradhan said that this help should be given immediately.

The second and perhaps a more fundamental decision to be taken was in regard to the Khalihaans. Some members, from both Bangawan and Samastipur, suggested that those people who had previously owned the plots which had now been left for the two Khalihaans in Samastipur might be asked to take them back and give alternative sites having *Domat* soil.[12] The persons who happened to be affected by this proposal were Pandit Ram Prasad and Nanhoo and Babu Lal Ahir. All three of them were members of the Panchayat and were also present. They said they were not prepared to accept this since it would be economically unremunerative for them.[13] Besides, they stated that they could not exchange plots of land at will; for this could only be done with the prior consent of the revenue officials. Even if they could agree to such a proposal, who was going to spend money to get the necessary sanction from the revenue officials?

The Pradhan as well as other members of the Panchayat came to realize that it would not be pragmatic to concentrate on this solution. Sri Ram Autar, a teacher who was not a member of the Panchayat but was very much respected and sought after for help and advice, was called from his home by the Pradhan to give the benefit of his counsel. Ram Autar was a very cautious

[12] Heavy soil.
[13] Crops in sandy and *Domat* soils do not give equal yields. They are much higher in the latter case.

person however. He always took time in deciding things, making sure that his decision would evoke no unfavourable response. After some time he suggested whether it would be possible for the Panchayat to consider utilization of mango orchards for Khalihaan purposes. There were three such orchards in Samastipur. Of course, they were not located very near to the village. But a distant location was only a marginal consideration since people in any case sleep in Khalihaans as long as their crops are there. One of these orchards belonged to Ram Autar himself; the other two were owned by Pradhan Bindra Prasad and Pandit Ram Prasad. Ram Autar declared that he would be willing to offer his own orchard for this purpose if others also cooperated. After the threshing operations were over, the orchards would have to be ploughed so that the trees should not be adversely affected by the hardening that results if threshing is done over a number of years. There was also the question of damage to the mango crop. Pradhan Bindra Prasad stated that he too was willing to offer his orchard for Khalihaan purposes provided these two conditions were agreed to. The members agreed.

The Lekhpal[14] and other officials of the revenue department were still assessing the damage caused by the fire in April 1969 one year after it had occurred. The loans were also to be sanctioned. Residents of Samastipur were, however, busy threshing their crops in the orchards of Ram Autar and Pradhan Bindra Prasad in the meanwhile. They were not sure about getting the relief from the government but noted with satisfaction the decision of the Panchayat regarding the Khalihaans.

Conclusion

The manner in which the village Panchayat of Samastipur reached its decision about the Khalihaan highlights several factors involved in local decision making – assessment of the situation, the personalities involved and the organizational context.

With regard to the main local issue, it may be noted that although there was only one effective Khalihaan in Samastipur and acute overcrowding was being experienced, the need of finding at least one more Khalihaan had not been felt by the village Panchayat. The need arose only when Darshan Mallah had an altercation with Babu Lal over the possession of their respective portions in the Khalihaan at Bangawan. The issue would not have acquired any urgency had it not been for the occurrence of the fire and the heavy loss suffered by all concerned. Thus the Khalihaan issue was decided in a crisis situation.

The office bearers of the Panchayat – notably the Pradhan and Up-Pradhan – and others as well, showed a great deal of political maturity and keen insight into the problem. In appraising issues and reaching decisions, previous experience and social standing of the leadership of any organization are always crucial. In this case, the Pradhan, by considering first the help needed for the fire victims, showed that he knew the importance of human problems in deciding fundamental questions. Even with regard to fixing the quantum

[14] Lekhpal is the official of the revenue department working at the village level.

of help, he applied his past experience to achieve the good of the victims. It must be stated, however, that it was not his skill, popularity and experience alone that enabled the Pradhan to decide things in a smooth manner: he also had co-operation from all the members of the Panchayat.

That the representatives of Chowdhry Ka Purwa readily agreed to help their fellow farmers from Bangawan and Samastipur although they were not directly or indirectly concerned with the problem of the Khalihaans or the fire shows the presence of structural cohesion in the Samastipur village Panchayat. Within the Samastipur revenue village units too, the spirit of brotherly give-and-take was more than evident. And in maintaining it the village leaders – Ram Autar and Pradhan Bindra Prasad in particular – provided a positive lead.

The present case study offers evidence of skilled utilization of political knowledge and experience by the Panchayat leadership in deciding issues. However, it is very difficult to make any generalizations based on one case only. Perhaps this may be possible when one has a number of such micro-studies representing various geographical areas. To the critics of Panchayati Raj, this study may serve as a pointer that not all the Panchayats are in a mess and not all the villages have experienced acute factionalism since the introduction of Panchayati Raj.

The Role of the Civil Service in the Development Planning Process

By A. R. HOYLE

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MOST countries in the world today, whether long or recently independent, are committed to development plans for economic and social advancement. Elaborate planning bodies commonly staffed by economists and, in the case of developing countries, by expatriate experts from international agencies, have been set up with the strong support of the head of government. Elaborate five-year plans are commonly prepared with goals expressed in overall gross national product percentage growth rates and in percentage figures for individual sectors. A very large amount of effort is put into plan development and few would cavil at the intellectual ability of the planners. Yet the hard fact remains that the proclaimed goals are either seldom realized or not realized in time.

The widespread nature of this situation in both developed and developing countries indicates quite clearly that this is probably due to a number of causes and that in any case no universal panacea has been found, despite the existence of numerous schools of public and development administration.

Some causes have been identified such as the setting of unrealistic or ill-defined goals, the lack of expected foreign aid and the lack of a proper evaluation and quantification of economic and social targets. But it would appear that even when these factors do not exist development plans commonly fail because they encounter a lack of administrative comprehension, administrative capability and administrative involvement.

One of the most widely held myths in developing planning is that plan formulation is one thing and plan implementation something else. The reason why planners, and especially economists, adopt this point of view is that in their experience plan formulation is a clear and rational matter whereas plan implementation is only too often at the mercy of politics, full of unforeseen administrative difficulties and often irrational.

This view may be acceptable to the central government planners but it bears as much relation to the environmental situation as does the theory of the firm to the daily occurrences of corporate life. In fact as far as the senior administrator is concerned plan formulation and plan implementation must go together and must be devised together.

The Planning Process

The development plan for any country, large or small, is commonly viewed as part of the total national system, as part of the governmental subsystem

and as the controlling subsystem of the administration and, as such, the planning process has six main elements viz:–

studying the environmental factors
setting the goals
determining the system outputs
determining the necessary system inputs
building an administrative model for the transformation process
providing a cybernetic mechanism

Central government planners commonly make some study of the political, economic and social environment in both national and international terms in the course of their plan formulation, although the very composition of most planning staffs makes it apparent that they will concentrate very largely upon the economic environment.[1]

In some cases plans are devised and imposed from the top down[2] but, in others, they are built up by the central planning organization on the basis of lesser plans submitted to it by ministries and departments and, when a shortfall or unforeseen political or social event occurs, the central organization may claim that its role is primarily one of co-ordination and determination of the optimum means and that it could never have sufficient staff or breadth of knowledge to do the work of departments or ministries.

There is, of course, an element of truth in this claim and, as experts in their own area, senior civil servants must accept the responsibility for studying the environmental factors which affect their own organizations. Planning involves an understanding of the constant interaction between the organization – in this case the state – and its environment. Logically one happening affects all other aspects of the environment but, in practice, even in the open system of government this view cannot be carried far and the senior administrator must, from knowledge and experience, determine the width of the boundary zone between the planning subsystem and its environment in his own work sector and hence derive the number of constraints which he must consider.

Goal setting is of course the key factor in the planning process and there can be no rational plan if there is no set of specific objectives.[3] But goals in the planning process from the view of the senior administrator represent not only the end point but, perhaps more importantly, the end towards which other administrative activities such as organizing and controlling are directed.

In development planning the goals are set at the political level but here they may be expressed in purely political and descriptive categoric terms such as "to become economically self-sufficient" or "a cow and a farm for every family", and both the planner and the administrator are faced with the difficulty of translating such phrases into specific objectives which as far as possible are quantified.

[1] For example see the heavy concentration of economists in various committees of the 1968-1969 New Zealand Development Conference.
[2] See Colin Leys' "The Analysis of Planning" in *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, 1969.
[3] But note that objectives derived from economic models are no substitute for the revealed preferences of the political leadership.

Once the general goals have been set with some sort of precision at the political level the administrator is in a position to set the sub-goals to which he will work. Obviously as the size of the functional areas decreases they can be set with greater precision. At this stage the administrator faces one of his main difficulties in the need to reconcile the often highly optimistic political and planning goals with the likely attainment. His dilemma is whether he should acquiesce in optimistic goals and face the inevitable criticism when there is the foreseen shortfall or protest at the beginning and be in immediate conflict with his political superiors. There is unfortunately no ready solution to this dilemma. With the continuing decline in the anonymity of the civil servant and in the willingness of ministers to accept blame for shortcomings, the administrator can only too easily find himself in the role of scapegoat. A close and understanding relationship with his minister can help but, in the final event, he must accept that the price of security of tenure may be unjust criticism from politicians and public alike.

System outputs are sub-goals and it is most desirable that they should be quantified. This however is not always possible as many of the goals will be social and political. One of the main problems is that when outputs are quantified the figures are so exact that they induce a false sense of the validity and feasibility of the plan, and politicians and public alike often fail to realise that the figures are frequently in fact hopeful approximations or extrapolations.

Viewing the planning process as a system should induce in the administrator a determination to consider all the necessary inputs but very often, while perfectly adequate consideration is given to the necessary physical inputs in the form of money and materials, a quite inadequate consideration is given to the human inputs. While the classical bureaucratic model may see technically competent human beings as being essentially interchangeable, only an administrator who is disinterested in performance will fail to realise that good staff selection and training for the key posts are important. Difficult though it is, he must endeavour to plan the use of staff whose motivations and satisfactions can be best achieved through carrying out the plan.

Building the administrative model for the transformation process between the inputs and the system outputs in the plan implementation process is a difficult task even for the trained civil servant for time is often short, the tasks and methods to be used are new, and there is usually a distinct resistance to change on the part of subordinate staff. Civil service administrative organizations are usually built on a firm hierarchical basis, with clearly determined tasks and the maximum attempt made to prevent overlapping of activities. If the planning is really innovative the conventional administrative structure may not be adequate and the administrator may have to produce a working organizational structure which is based upon programmes rather than work areas, where work areas cannot avoid overlapping and where interdisciplinary teams led at different times by different people may be the most satisfactory form of organization.

A trained civil servant is well aware of the necessity for control but only too seldom does the planning group build in an adequate cybernetic system at all stages in both the plan formulation and plan implementation processes.

Particularly in the latter process it is necessary that there be adequate feedback in the control subsystem not only from the output side of the model but also from the transformation stage and from the input stage. The main means of control will be the feedback of statistical data but, in many countries, the administrator faces the fact that such data is scarce and unreliable and a considerable effort may have to be devoted to creating data collection and evaluation units in his own ministry or department. In systems terms goal achievement is impossible without adequate coding and negative feedback.

In the whole planning process there is no more difficult task than planning and building the administrative capacity to achieve the goals because, as the senior administrator knows, so many of the parameters are probalistic rather than deterministic.

Planning Implementation in a Developing Country

The foregoing applies to any national planning system but in a developing country the importance of the development plan is often overwhelming because it is seen as one of the main paths to nation building. Hence the role of the civil service in building a strong administrative infrastructure capable of implementing the plan is crucial.

In former colonial territories a basic administrative infrastructure was provided at an early stage to maintain the basic governmental functions of maintaining law and order, collecting revenue and providing elementary services but typically the last years of the colonial period and the years since have been ones of stress in the administrative arm of government. Better education, a willingness on the part of the government to spend more money, pressure from international bodies and growing expectations on the part of the populace have combined to push government activity into an ever widening field and have increasingly shown its deficiencies.

The adoption of an ambitious development plan without the creation of a strong administrative structure leads to great difficulties which are only too often hardly realised by many ministers and planners who seem to assume that plans are self-executing.

The position was put well by Donald Stone when he said:–

"The solution is to engage in administrative planning as a companion step with economic and social planning. Only when this is done can one lay claim to effective development planning. The administrative policies, measures, processes and instruments to carry out the programme and projects envisioned in the plan should be essential parts of the basic planning documents. Organizational responsibilities, administrative arrangements and operating methods, as well as resource utilization, should be defined for each sector. This applies to such functions as agriculture, education and public works; to the multifunctional programmes of local government, urban government and rural development; and to the sum total of policy and administrative actions required to foster entrepreneurism in the private sector."[4]

[4] Donald Stone in unpublished paper *Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh.*

Education and Training for Development Planning

Most planning organization staffs and most senior civil servants have a good education and long experience but in many cases the main effect of education and training is to produce an aversion to change. The traditional – even if not the only – way of doing things is seen to be the best and the implementation of an ambitious plan with an administration short of many resources can be a guaranteed cause of failure. Such an attitude is not restricted to the old or to those educated in one culture but may equally be that of the senior administrator in a developing country who is quite young but has accepted traditional Western values, norms and earlier methods of administration.

Development planning, particularly in the implementation stage, places a premium upon the ability to meet very difficult situations by innovation – innovation in the conceptual approach, in organization and in staffing. In some countries ministers take a close personal interest in the organization and activities of their ministry or department and they may likewise need to be convinced of the need for innovation. In theory at least, the administrator is not an initiator of major policy decisions on either goals or means, but he is normally in very close touch with his minister and a decided part of his role is to appreciate, and press for, the need for innovation. The questions who, how and why are as vital to any senior civil servant engaged in the planning process as they are to a methods officer.

Training is a part of administration to which lip service – but not much more – is usually paid and in many routine, almost unchanging, functions the organization can limp along. But plan implementation generally demands new activities and very often new divisions or departments for which staff must be trained before the full load of implementation descends. To a degree often not appreciated, even by senior civil servants, a failure in planning is a failure to train and to motivate staff.

Communication Planning

Under colonial regimes, despite the goodwill and paternalism of most expatriate officers, there was a considerable gap in understanding between the administration and the populace, particularly in planning activities. The expatriates were separated from the populace by race, language, education, ethos and sophistication and, despite the fact that many learnt the local language and endeavoured to understand the local culture, true communication was infrequent. Partial localization did not do a great deal to remedy this situation because the local-born regarded themselves, and were generally regarded by the populace, as an élite group. In some cases they came mainly from one racial or tribal group or from one area of the country and had little sympathy with or understanding of other groups. In fact they sometimes tended to be regarded as quasi-expatriates.

In the independent state, dedicated to building a nation, this situation cannot be allowed to continue and planning simply imposed from the top has a greatly reduced chance of success. The senior administrators must build much closer links with all significant elements in the population and at the

very least comprehend popular views. The further planning objectives can be explained, comprehended and accepted at grass roots level, the greater the chances of success. Interest representation groups are commonly absent in developing countries. Community development has made a significant contribution to solving this problem but with central planning activities it can never be the complete answer. The senior administrator has to make a transition from paternalism to being one of the community – in fact from being the servant of the government to being the servant of the public. This is not easily done as many locally born administrators have had extensive training overseas, have been influenced by Western thought and activity patterns, and find it much easier to take refuge in the authoritarian pattern than to explain to and seek the ideas and co-operation of people who are often unsophisticated, have traditional patterns of behaviour and are unwilling to embrace change.

The Use of Experts

At both the formulation and implementation stages of planning it may become apparent that the desired outputs can only be attained by the use of foreign experts, both planners and technicians.

Experts provided by either an international agency or a metropolitan country or hired on short-term contract are a common feature of life in developing countries. The expert is a very different sort of person to the expatriate officer of the former colonial power or to the academic, etc. who has chosen to live as long as possible in the country. The expert has technical knowledge and prestige and often considerable administrative experience but normally little local knowledge. His concepts have frequently been moulded in a large developed country and he may ignore or be impatient of the constraints imposed upon him in the local situation. Only too frequently he produces a broad plan or seeks to implement one by means which ignore the actual lack of resources both physical and administrative. Planning economists in particular often appear to assume that the plan they have devised is self-executing.

The administrator on the other hand knows the local scene, the available resources and hopefully the local requirements. He is often chagrined when his ideas are not accepted and an expert is imported. In this case he may give the minimum of co-operation and after the expert's departure may seek to disparage or sabotage the plan.

Neither of these situations is acceptable in the planning situation. Where it is considered that an expert must be employed, the senior administrator must pre-plan to get the best use of him. It is the responsibility of the administrator to set out clearly the outputs expected from the expert and when he arrives to ensure that he fully comprehends these as well as the limited inputs which are available. Further, the expert must be carefully selected. Although ultimately ministers may be closely associated with the expert they have little time to concern themselves with the mechanics of his appointment which inevitably are left to the civil servant.

Problems in Planning in the Civil Service

There is an almost infinite number of planning problems in both the formulation and the implementation stage which affect the civil servant, some of particular importance.

In some countries the lack of a workable party system has meant a constant change in ministerial posts. In others military coups have resulted in a succession of ministers. Even in more successful political systems there may be numerous ministerial changes. Such happenings make meaningful ministerial participation in the planning process, particularly at the formulation stage, almost impossible and, as the administrator finds it impracticable to build up a close working relationship and understanding with his minister, so he is forced more and more to accept the full responsibility for any shortfalls in the plan formulation and implentation.

In all countries the senior civil servant has to tolerate the frequent setting by politicians of non-rational goals but this happens more often in developing countries where a less sophisticated populace or an extremist group may demand such goals from an indigenous government. The natural reaction of ministers is to look to their real power base and to give at least apparent support to such goals. In this situation the senior administrator must see his role as being that of a brake – a pointer-out of the hard facts of life in both the national and the international environment – but if he is to retain the confidence of his minister he must also see his role as that of an educator. Essentially it is the difference between a positive and a negative approach to the problem.

Few developing countries have sufficient trained administrative staff or are likely to have them in the near future. The administrator is then faced with the dilemma of recommending the employment of large numbers of non-nationals or depleting his ranks at a critical time by sending staff on intensive training courses. The former course is generally unpopular politically and with junior staff, who see their promotion blocked, and the latter course may be impracticable because of already critical staff shortage and the lack of appropriate training facilities.

There is seldom any shortage of ideas or views on plan formulation but the administrator is constantly concerned about the gap between goals and available quantifiable data. In the whole planning process certainly one of the greatest single problems is the continuing lack of hard statistical information.

Finally there is the problem of shortage of funds. In any country popular aspirations outrun funds but in a developing country the problem is particularly acute. The whole planning process pre-supposes the availability of certain amounts of finance from internal and external sources and a major problem facing the administrator is how to assess this realistically and convince sometimes optimistically-minded ministers. Inevitably this places a premium upon inter-departmental communication and on a continuing dialogue between the administration and the people.

Development plans which are conceived solely in the remote corridors of a central planning office, away from the realities and disillusionments of political

and civil service life are bound to be symbols rather than successes. But even where the politician and the civil servant are involved in the plan formulation it is improbable that it will be a success if the administrator has not closely studied his environment, thought about all the system inputs as well as the outputs, planned an effective administrative machine, communicated with the populace on their own terms as well as with the politicians, planned how to use experts and sought to secure the complete involvement of his staff. Planners are important people in any nation-building programme but all wisdom is not given to them and the success of any national development plan is dependent primarily upon the civil servant in his ministry or department looking beyond the day-to-day tasks and the apparently unreasonable demands of the planning staff.

Quarterly Notes

SWEDEN – *Symposium on European Co-operation in training Regional Planners from Developing Countries. Stockholm, 5–11 September,* 1971
(contributed by M. Juppenlatz)

This Symposium was a follow-up of the Symposium "Training of Planners for Comprehensive regional development", Warsaw, 14–28 June, 1971. Both symposia were sponsored under U.N. ECOSOC Resolution 1086 (xxxix).

The symposium was organized on the basis of group discussions on three themes, for which papers were presented, as follows:–

Theme 1: The integrated Social Science approach to regional planning in Developing Countries, and the implications for the training of regional planners;

Professor Janus A. Ziolkowski,
University of Poznan,
Poland.

Theme 2: Requirements for the training of Regional Planners with an integrated Social Science approach;

Professor J. G. M. Hilhorst,
Institute of Social Sciences,
The Hague.

Theme 3: Co-operation of European institutions in training programmes for Regional Planners;

Professor Kosta Mihailovic,
Economic Institute of Belgrade.

Of the twenty-five invited participants (i.e. apart from agency representation, resource persons, experts and observers) eleven were physical planners, and the remainder were drawn from other social science disciplines.

The response generally to the papers presented for themes 1 and 2 was that an integrated approach to regional planning, incorporating the social science disciplines, was essential. Stress was laid on the need for:

(i) a further understanding of the mechanism of social development in the different regions of the developing countries,

(ii) redesigning many of the established techniques for monitoring, evaluating and forecasting, especially as they relate to input-output and cost-benefit analysis, to include the social and human components. It was envisaged that the social components should be quantified adequately with economic measurement, and the interaction of both should be identified in the spatial dimension of settlement patterns (i.e. the geographical and physical aspects, and the built urban form).

Regional Planning courses in European Institutes

It was suggested that agreement should be reached among those institutes in Europe (offering such courses for the developing countries) on the content of the "core courses" for regional planning, to which specialized options could be attached. This agreement would aim to establish the universally accepted pre-requisites for "regional planning", which could then be recognized as a specific discipline in its own place.

Recommendations were made that priority should be given by European institutes to providing short-term orientation courses (or seminars) for senior decision-makers, and administrators from the developing countries, specifically to show how regional planning is the essential link between national planning and local settlement, all in the process of national development, and the type of specialized training which staff should be given.

Representatives from the developing countries emphasized that all training programmes should take into account the political climate, the conditions of employment, and the administrative framework of the country within which the regional planner, once trained, will have to work; the national objectives and sense of values of the countries for which the training is provided, should also be taken into account.

Special courses need to be provided also for those who will be teaching regional planning in the developing countries.

Suggested ways of providing assistance

A direct form of assistance which European institutes could provide to assist in regional planning in the developing country would be to send a carefully selected MOBILE TEAM of specialists, who could visit several districts or regions, and give short-term orientation courses to the teachers and staff of the institutes, or planning agencies, on location.

This team, or other European institutions might provide "regional planning WORKSHOPS", in which technicians and all concerned from local institutes, universities, colleges and planning agencies, could come together for studying the specific needs of the locality, and wherein "pilot projects" can be initiated, and linked to long range national planning objectives.

These suggestions led to the proposal for more "twinning" of European Universities with counterpart universities in the developing countries.

Another suggestion was made for the introduction of "regional planning cadetships", by which the governments made provision for recruitment and training of graduates specifically for regional planning. Such officers would be required to spend sufficient time in each government department to learn the mechanism and function of the respective departments, before being included in the national planning team, or undertaking regional planning in the government service.

Source material for teaching

A strong plea was made for more research into methods and techniques of socio-economic prognosis.

It was suggested that consideration should be given to attaching a European teaching/research unit to on-going (or proposed) long-term (3–5 years) regional development projects in the developing countries for the purposes of monitoring and evaluating the projects, and possibly to refine methods and techniques for socio-economic prognosis. Such projects could be any of those which are usually recognized as regional development projects, such as:

river basin settlement projects,
metropolitan based regional planning,
river valley comprehensive development,
backward or problem areas, etc., etc.

It was generally agreed that more action research, linked with actual development activity in the developing countries, was needed to provide better up-to-date and valid teaching material.

Attention was also drawn to the fact that no adequate machinery exists at present whereby academic and research institutes in Europe can properly establish a working relationship with on-going and regional development projects in developing countries. It was suggested that the existing Technical Assistance agencies of the separate governments might be willing to consider acting to assist in this respect.

POLAND – *Symposium on training of planners for comprehensive regional development, June,* 1971.

Inter alia conclusions and recommendations included the following points:

(1). Regional development planning should be promoted as an important instrument for achieving a more effective integration of economic, social and ecological aspects of development and for assuring appropriate development of the human environment.

(2). Comprehensive regional development planning as a process involves participation and action by many population groups, professional disciplines and specialists, administrators and political decision-makers. There is a need to promote an appreciation of the effectiveness of the regional development approach among all these groups.

(3). There is an urgent need for continuing exchange of experience and information among different countries, both developed and developing, to promote better understanding of the conceptual, methodological and administrative frameworks of regional development planning and to systematize the knowledge gained in different countries.

(4). The advent of regional development planning requires introduction of regional statistical and information systems and their harmonization with national statistical and information systems. Steps should be taken to avoid duplication in data collection and to promote co-ordination of regional, sectoral and central statistics.

(5). Consideration should be given to the development of strategic regional statistics and information systems in the light of national priorities and

circumstances. Such systems should include not only economic statistics but also data pertinent to social development.

(6). National and international action to standardize terminologies, definitions, classifications and methodologies employed in collecting, processing and disseminating data.

(7). At this point in time no single discipline completely trains regional planners. Many disciplines contribute to the body of knowledge, techniques and methodologies pertinent to regional development. It is therefore, important for these resources to be integrated into a rational, interdisciplinary training programme for regional planners.

(8). The disciplines particularly relevant to regional planning have to be identified fully. These may include economics, sociology and social work, geography, engineering and physical planning.

(9). The task of training personnel for regional development planning constitutes a difficult task for national authorities and international technical co-operation programmes. While the need is great in all developing countries, it is particularly acute in African countries due to lack of training facilities generally. International programmes of training are required for groups of countries which cannot afford or are not ready for national institutions and for training of high level personnel from all countries.

(10). A major effort is also needed in developing training materials and methodologies for regional development planning. For this reason, research in different aspects of regional development planning should be increased at national and international levels. Whenever possible, training and action-research should be combined.

Source: background paper for the Symposium held in Stockholm, September 1971.

UNITED NATIONS – *U.N. Staff College*

The UNITAR representative in Geneva, Richard Symonds, has been engaged in preparing a feasibility study for a U.N. Staff College, and his draft report has been discussed by the Board of Trustees. A general feeling emerged that there was now an opportunity within the United Nations system to give new impetus to staff training on a higher level and that UNITAR could play a vital role in this regard.

In the *Study of the Capacity of the U.N. Development System* it was noted that "a Staff College should be established, possibly in co-operation with UNITAR" and it was agreed by the Board of Trustees that this concept, which had originated with a concern for the need to familiarize international officials with modern management techniques should be developed.

It was decided that there should be a two-stage approach and that, during the first stage, courses should be organized experimentally in different places. The general feeling was that courses for fairly senior staff members should

have priority and that the most important subjects were in fields of management and development. A number of other suggestions were given, including a course for legal officers.

In this first stage a small core of staff would be supplemented by visiting professors who would do much of the teaching. Special attention would be given to the newest training methods being used at the international level. It would be desirable for the College to engage in reasearch, the results of which could be fed back into the courses.

These first stage courses should be generally limited, in the opinion of the Board, to international officials within the UN system, but when it came to the second stage a much wider range of participation should be sought among officials of national and inter-governmental organizations and representatives of non-governmental organizations in relationship with the UN and its agencies.

Source: *UNITAR News*, Winter 1970–71

UNITED NATIONS – *UNITAR Seminars*

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), in co-operation with the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), is initiating a series of regional seminars on a new subject: procurement problems as related to international development finance. The aim is to encourage developing countries to make the best possible use of foreign exchange resources when they import goods and services for development purposes.

The programmes are regarded as an opportunity for officials from developing countries to improve their knowledge of the problems and techniques related to international bidding and contracting.

Participants in the seminars are likely to be senior professionals in ministries and agencies, either legal advisers or concerned with handling public sector procurement. No more than twenty participants will be accepted for each seminar.

Source: *UN Information Service*, Geneva.

Book Reviews

Developing the Third World, by RONALD ROBINSON; *Cambridge University Press*; index, pp. 290; £4·20.

Attending conferences is a new and dangerous form of addiction. However much the victim tries to conceal the symptoms, the expert recognizes them at once; the victim unconsciously peppers his talk with references to things said, heard or overheard in exotic resorts or Cathedral towns; "as I said in Talloire . . ."; "as we concluded in Bellagio . . ."; or certain stock phrases give him away: "of course, the most interesting things were said not in the papers but in the bar . . ." or "the food was awful but the girls danced on the tables . . .". Then there is the air of utter deprivation on the faces of those victims that were not invited. The victim knows full well that attendance is not only a waste of his time and other people's money, but that it might lead to the disintegration of his mental personality; that talk, composed of randomness and repetition, will sap away his strength. He resolves on a cure. He joins that wonderful organization "Conference-Goers Anonymous" to share his guilt with others in an attempt to kick the habit. Just as the painful withdrawal symptoms wear off and he begins to lead again a normal, healthy life, some pusher, like Ronald Robinson, or Austin Robinson dangles the promise of things said in papers or heard and overheard in bars at Cambridge or at Rio, and, before you can say Ron Robinson, he is hooked again. He is off on another trip, euphoric while it lasts, but disastrous in its ultimate effects.

It will be evident to the perceptive reader that the above is the beginning of a True Confession. My last hope is that reviewing is a more effective cure, a better opportunity for sublimation, than joining Conference-Goers Anonymous. The book for review is a selection of papers discussed at the well-known Cambridge Overseas Studies Committee Conference, under the chairmanship of Ronald Robinson. His escape to Oxford as Beit Professor of Commonwealth History suggests that he may have finally been weaned. In any case, the results of these addictions can be great creative works and *Developing the Third World*, like *Kubla Khan*, is such a major achievement.

It contains sections on the general perspective, industrialization, rural development, the role of government and aid. In addition to some of the principal papers submitted to conferences in 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1968, Robinson conveys a lively impression of the issues under debate and you can almost hear the crashing of the barriers between disciplines, walks of life and continents.

The section on aid, though still interesting, has inevitably dated. The dispute between Chenery and Balogh on multilateral versus bilateral aid largely ignores the inelectable fact (though it is implicit in Balogh's argument) that in a world where sovereign power rests with nation states, growing commitments to multilateral agencies are bound to lead to growing donor countries' involvement in how the money is spent by these agencies. If

evidence is needed, it is provided by the gruelling ordeal that an American director of the Asian Development Bank underwent before a Senatorial Committee. Again, Chenery's plea for a shift from project to programme approach in aid-giving fails to allow for the political reality. Programme aid is "paid for" by acceptance of certain policies – control of inflation, devaluation, higher taxation, even land reform. A proud sovereign nation does not like its policies to be prescribed by foreign bodies. The groups harmed by these policies will do everything to discredit the aid donors. Albert Hirschman has suggested a model. A poor recipient country wishes to maintain a certain average distance from the rich donor. This distance is measured along two dimensions, the extent to which it adopts economic policies suggested by the rich donor and the extent to which it takes the donor's position on leading issues of international politics. Donor's success on one front will result in an urge to compensate on the other. He cites the attempt of the Quadros government in Brazil to move towards neutralism in international relations after having adopted economic policies advocated by the US and the IMF; Pakistan's *rapprochment* with China; and some Indian reactions after she seemed so "reasonable" in domestic economic policy. Only IG Patel (whose paper, alas is not reprinted) saw clearly the dangers of applying "performance criteria" from his vantage ground in the Indian Treasury.

The section on rural development advances the "two-tier" approach: concentrate some resources on that part which has the greatest productive potential and use the rest to alleviate poverty and underemployment in the remainder. But it is never made clear what principles should determine this division. Allocation to the productive sub-sector means more relief of poverty later because it increases the production of wage goods, so that the choice becomes one of inter-temporal poverty and underemployment relief. The section on industrialization contains the controversy about whether technology should be capital – or labour-intensive and the seeds of a theme discussed at a later conference, viz. employment.

While it is surely a good thing to bring together politicians, officials, planners, and scholars from different countries to exchange views and to compare experiences, research and diplomacy do not go well together. Intellectual confrontation must be ruthlessly honest; diplomatic gatherings must be tactful. I remember writing in a paper for one of these conferences (not printed in this volume) that absence of habits of personal cleanliness were a component in the vicious circle of under-development – leading to low levels of health, to low productivity and thereby perpetuating poverty. I was asked by an official in the Ministry to take out this reference, because it would cause offence. There is in the whole book hardly any mention of corruption, one of the most serious obstacles to development (in spite of what clever American political scientists may say). When it is mentioned, it is played down. Perhaps less surprisingly, there is, as Ronald Robinson says "for obvious reasons", no discussion of revolution. But otherwise, the book is a valuable record of the development of thought on key issues in development during the last ten years.

Certain general themes emerge from the conference papers and in the discussions. One is the Hydra-headed nature of development; a second is

its jigsaw puzzle characteristics; a third, balancing the pessimistic implications of the first two, is an optimistic prognosis.

By Hydra-headed I mean that, though economists may have a solution to every problem, every solution presents at least two new problems. Health control and the prolongation of life lead to accelerated population growth with all the difficulties that this entails; the Green Revolution leads to vulnerability to plant disease, to rural inequality and market surpluses. Industrialization and modernization constitute threats to employment. One generation of solution breeds another generation of problems. Development, like a civil servant, has a problem to every solution.

The jigsaw puzzle means that there are no simple remedies; that a combination of fertilizer and pill will not restore the food-population equilibrium. A wide variety of interlocking measures is needed. Food plus fertilizers plus water plus roads plus markets plus equipment; education plus rural reform plus jobs. Development is not like a sausage machine, where you pour in "resources" and out comes "development". Many of the pieces in the jigsaw puzzle are not economic: land reform, an efficient administration, a proper educational system, the eradication of corruption, efficient management. So many things must be done together, at the right time and in the right place, yet resources are so scarce. The existence of the Hydra and the need for a series of concerted actions might lead to pessimistic conclusions about prospects.

But there is throughout the book a note of optimism. Part of this is surely diplomatic and required by etiquette. But this is not the whole story. It is clear that development, though difficult, is not insoluble; that there is no ground for despair. Once we subtract ideological and diplomatic optimism, there remains a residuum of practical hope. Under Robinson's vigorous guidance, the conclusions that emerge are cheerful without being complacent. Like Oliver Edwards in Boswell's Johnson, Robinson is unfit to be an economist – a practitioner of what used to be called the dismal science – because cheerfulness keeps breaking in.

PAUL STREETEN

THE ADMINISTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT – LESSONS FROM INDIA, by GUY HUNTER; *Oxford University Press*, 1970; pp. 160; £1·75.

It is a gain as much to India as to the subject that so well-informed and sympathetic a student of rural problems should bring his knowledge of Africa and Asia to bear on a careful appraisal of the administrative problems of agricultural development. In presenting his conclusions in a somewhat generalized form, the author has combined with much skill inferences from Indian experience with observations on agricultural experiments in several countries in Africa. As he would himself doubtless emphasize, differences in man-land ratios, levels of technology, market conditions, land tenures and even crop patterns are so great that the conclusions drawn in the book are pertinent in the first place to the Indian sub-continent. The reader interested

in African agriculture will need to make an additional effort to relate them to his own conditions.

Institutional developments spring from certain basic needs, but they have an evolutionary character, beginning with certain assumptions and changing as the problems to be resolved take on new shape and dimensions. Neither the tasks to be accomplished, nor the institutions and the methods required can remain unchanged; yet, at each stage, beyond administrative relationships and the quantities involved, there are questions of principle at stake. Mr. Hunter's approach is fair-minded even where his comment is severe, so that it is all the more necessary to link up his positive recommendations to his implicit assumptions about the nature of agriculture, its conditions of growth and development, the primacy of the farmer as an individual, and the enabling functions which Governments should be content to perform.

In a short review, it is possible to draw attention only to some of the main propositions of Mr. Hunter's closely reasoned work, which attempts both to convey the essential facts and to present a critique of Indian agricultural administration. He is at pains to give due credit to the education and support provided to farmers by community development workers over a long period of years and sees some recent advances against this background of general awareness and concern with development. Within the limits of her resources, India's development plans put much emphasis on investment in irrigation. This was a necessary accompaniment to agricultural extension, but the expansion of irrigation is a slow and costly undertaking. Therefore, one could perhaps question the dichotomy suggested by Mr. Hunter when he remarks broadly that agricultural advance has owed more to investment than to organization or propaganda or literacy or Co-operatives or community development. The growth and diversification of investment in irrigation takes time and, until recent years, aside from large and medium works, with rural electrification still at the beginning, there were real limits to the extent to which farmers could obtain adequate supplies of water under their own control. After two decades, even now barely twenty per cent of India's cultivated land receives some kind of irrigation. Crop research for unirrigated agriculture has still a very long way to go.

Where Mr. Hunter bases his criticism of intensive agricultural development projects or even of elected councils on administrative analysis, his points are well taken and must receive close attention. Perhaps he could have explained more fully to the reader the circumstances which led to each particular course being adopted. This is important, for instance, in understanding the background of Indian experience which caused agricultural extension and community development to be developed as one package following the proposals of the Grow More Food Committee of 1952, or the decisions in favour of a system of democratic institutions at the village, block and district levels in 1958. The issues were thoroughly examined and represented at the time the best judgment available. On co-operatives, a fuller examination than Mr. Hunter has been able to undertake would be required to sustain his view that they have little to offer to the small farmer. It is true that some of the assumptions have been found difficult and must be reconsidered. For the

failures which are now known, there are reasons as well as appropriate measures and conditions that can be identified and pursued. Obviously, on such a matter, two views, each honestly held, can be advanced, and the argument will need to be taken further than Mr. Hunter has found possible within the compass of his study.

Mr. Hunter has a significant point when he states that it is in the pre-planning stage that decisions which have a real claim to be called policy decisions have to be made. It would, therefore, be useful to remind ourselves that in the early fifties there was in India a widely-held view of the essential nature of India's agricultural situation and her rural structure and of the policies through which these could be transformed while, at the same time, translating political into economic and social democracy. At that time, for most farmers agriculture was yet a way of life. Agricultural technology had advanced to a limited extent, and large investments, large supplies of fertilizers and pesticides, and credit institutions, co-operative or otherwise, which could reach every village, were still quite distant. The role of these factors was understood at least in general terms but, in the circumstances, the social and organizational aspects of agricultural development loomed larger and, in truth, on the morrow of freedom, so much more appeared within India's capacity than has since been achieved.

Gradually, it became clearer that the technological side of agriculture had to be greatly strengthened, that agriculture required large scarce foreign exchange and other resources and a growing industrial base, that price incentives were vital to increased production, and that the very processes of economic growth and enlargement of the market brought new differentiations within the agrarian structure and served to make agriculture increasingly profitable to those who had surpluses to sell. Thanks to the harsh agricultural experience of the mid-sixties (itself partly structural and partly traceable to natural causes) and the coming of the high-yielding varieties, the scales have moved in favour of incentives and support to the individual farmer and apparently, in the eyes of at least some technologists, administrators and economists, this is the direction for the future, leaving the social consequences to be taken up at a later day. Can we be so sure that the right balance between organization and technology, between social and technological change, has been already struck? Countries like India and Pakistan have two complementary giant-size tasks to undertake at the same time: to find adequate answers both to their specific agricultural problem and the wider rural problem. Can these long remain separate from one another, and will remedies which only treat symptoms meet the minimum tests?

This is one of the major dilemmas in devising, according to the circumstances of each economy and each social and political system, an appropriate structure of agricultural and rural institutions. It would have been an advantage if Mr. Hunter could have gone beyond his doubtless constructive analysis of administrative implications and enquired whether the condition of the small farmer and the farm labourer can be changed without at the same time changing the ownership of land and the organization of agriculture, and establishing and maintaining genuine institutions at the level of the com-

munity. We should distinguish perhaps the continuing elements of the agricultural problem, whether these are social, technological, or administrative, from the policy choices which are made from time to time on different hypotheses, and the variations in administrative organization and methods which must be undertaken in response to new needs and pressures. It is safe to guess that some at least of Mr. Hunter's propositions might have been differently stated were he writing in the early sixties or in the mid-seventies, for he would then be observing a different range of experience from a different perspective. While adapting existing institutions and modes of work to present needs, as we gain in knowledge and experience, we shall still need to keep an open mind on the fundamental issues involved in agricultural and rural development and their administration.

TARLOK SINGH

AFRICAN BUSINESSMEN, by PETER MARRIS and ANTHONY SOMERSET; *Routledge & Kegan Paul*; tables, appendices, index; pp. 288; £3·00.

In this study, Mr. Peter Marris and Mr. Anthony Somerset – both experienced research men – set out to discover "what helps or hinders" entrepreneurship among African businessmen in Kenya, and "where it comes from and how it may stultify itself in the struggle to survive". By extracting information – in the absence of systematic records and data – from more than 1000 firms, they manage to achieve considerable success in their inquiry.

Starting with a pre-colonial history of the development of trade and business in an African (Mahiga) community, the book traces the evolution of African businesses up to 1966/67, when the study was undertaken. In this work, the origins, characteristics and problems of African businessmen are identified and analysed and, based on this analysis, various suggestions are made.

Although the book concerns African entrepreneurship in Kenya, it is nevertheless interesting to note that the conclusions formulated on pages 238 to 240 indicate that the problems of entrepreneurship are largely universal. However, since Kenya is not a typical African country, the applicability of these conclusions to other African countries should not be taken for granted. For instance, the presence of a large Asian business community in Kenya and other East African countries presents problems which may not be found in West Africa, where this class of businessmen is almost non-existent.

The authors happily reach the conclusion that there is no lack of entrepreneurial talent among Africans in Kenya and that entrepreneurial opportunities are plentiful. They, however, point out that due to all sorts of disrupting forces, this talent is not, in many ways, utilized; nor are the entrepreneurial opportunities always easily realized.

The book succeeds in giving a clear insight into the problems of African businessmen. Such problems are many and varied. Those that have been identified include the lack of capital and credit facilities, lack of knowledge and experience in business practices, difficulty in obtaining supplies at genuinely wholesale prices, ignorance of the market, unfair competition,

difficulty in finding trustworthy partners and technically qualified employees, multiplicity of small business interests, excessive drinking and claims of family. A reader who is familiar with the situation in Kenya will, no doubt, be impressed with the validity of this diagnosis. As he goes through the list, cases of businesses that have failed due to one or more of these factors will come to mind.

Many of the African businessmen are aware of these obstacles to success, and some of them try to overcome them. But this is not always easy. In attempting to do so, the businessman sometimes finds himself "isolated, within both his community and the wider society" and consequently resorts to a "mistrustful, self-reliant style of management, where he attempts to keep all aspects of the business under the control of himself and his working partners". However, sooner or later, he discovers, through experience, that this is no solution to his problems of management.

The authors do not pretend to offer a panacea to the problems facing African entrepreneurship in Kenya. They recognize that these problems are indeed "intricately related, entangling businessmen in a web of influences which cannot be unravelled by a single plan" and that "the study suggests that any single-minded prescription would be misleading". However, they venture to suggest a series of remedies, which include the establishment of a marketing advisory service which "would help to introduce the African businessmen to potential customers both in Kenya and abroad, . . . how to organize distribution, where to advertise"; training in various management techniques; Government participation in equity in African businesses rather than granting loans; and the provision of legal and banking advice to African businessmen.

The publication of this book is both timely and significant. In Kenya and other African countries, the African businessmen have an important role to play in the development of the country. It is true to say that in any economy, small-scale businesses are essential in integrating and adapting different parts of the economy. The success of these businesses is, therefore, crucial. But this success can only come if entrepreneurial talent – the ability to bring idle assets into use – is developed and utilized. We have already seen that this talent is present in Kenya; what is now needed is the right environment for it.

It is not too much to hope that this study will be given the credit it deserves, and that the suggestions made by the authors would be taken seriously in an earnest endeavour to bring about and improve the effectiveness of African businessmen not only in Kenya, but also elsewhere in Africa.

D. A. OMARI

CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA, by A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE; *Oxford University Press*; *London*, 1971; Two volumes; £9·50.

In his two volume documentary source book of the crisis years 1966–1970 Mr. Kirk-Greene has once again provided an invaluable resource for both scholar and layman alike. The volumes contain two hundred and twenty

seven contemporary documents ranging from the Special Branch report of the events of the first coup of 15 January 1966 to Gowon's victory message broadcast exactly four years later. The mass of documents are verbatim statements of the leading actors in the Nigerian drama set down, as the author says, "as they were uttered and before they disappear or are dangerously remembered". It is hard to fault the selection but of course the documents present only published material and inevitably pose as many questions as they answer.

Three points can perhaps usefully be made. First Nigerian politics, and as we now know civil war as well, is fought with words which often bear little relationship to the reality of the underlying alliances and actual compromises being worked out. In parliamentary days outsiders were often horrified by the violence of comment usually belied by the friendliest of personal relationships. While the press was full of hatred Gowon and Ojukwu were in frequent telephone conversation on Jack and Emeka terms. When the propaganda war was at its height there was considerable fraternization between frontline troops and exchange of Star beer for transistor radios and the Castro-style caps favoured by the Biafran soldiers. The Aburi record, contained in the documents, is a good illustration of the Nigerian facility for reconciliation. On the one hand Nigerians, with a long tradition of oral story telling have excelled as modern broadcasters and journalists, making the most of every good story, but on the other the overwhelming pattern of extended family relationships makes reconciliation a skill in which Nigerians of all tribes learn to graduate at an early age.

Secondly, one must realize that top men very rarely write their own speeches in Nigeria anymore than they do elsewhere. But whereas older bureaucracies have long institutionalized structures to ensure that the final job comes out right, the Nigerian civil service, for all its competence, tends to lack a needed unity and direction in the higher regions, and particularly did so in a period when civil servants were themselves politicians. Ojukwu comes through fairly consistently in his speeches and statements but Gowon is harder to discern. There are one or two speeches which are so obviously "him" for those who have personal knowledge of the honest, straight-forward soldier who presumes that everyone else behaves as he does himself like an officer and gentleman that they make a strong contrast with speeches which have been drafted by other hands. There is also inconsistency between the various federal statements of the cause and events of the crisis and one can see not only several hands but those of men of conflicting views. It would be fascinating to know who wrote some of the speeches and just how much consultation there was before. Listening to Ironsi making his "The Regions are Abolished" speech on the 24 May 1966 I was convinced that he, for one, had never seen it before and had the impression that a speech intended to announce the development plan had been turned into something quite different at the eleventh hour by somebody who played no part in the original drafting. There is also the much discussed speech of Gowon made on 1 August 1966 which contains the controversial statement about the basis for unity no longer existing. It could well have been a re-draft of a speech which an experienced civil servant would have scrapped altogether and written anew.

Thirdly, it is important to remember that those outside Nigeria were much more involved in the propaganda war than were those within. Victory for Ojukwu depended upon arousing world conscience. He very nearly succeeded but re-reading the speeches now it is difficult to understand how rational men drank in the emotional outbursts from Biafra in preference to the always cool and reasoned statements of Anthony Enahoro. Sadly one can only presume that Biafran skill and money in using the elaborate public relations structures of the Western world paid dividends while the extreme ineptitude of the Federal Nigerians in promoting their cause did them untold harm. One can only hope that the developing world be spared in future the deadly attention of modern mass communications media.

Although primarily a source book Mr. Kirk-Greene has included an excellent narrative of events which is both accurate in detail and impartial in presentation. I found only one error. There were no disturbances in Jos and Bukuru in May 1966. The uneasy peace maintained there made the massacres of October all the more horrible as few Ibos had left for home and those remaining were falsely confident that they would not be attacked. With the comprehensive array of primary materials and the sound editorial perspective these two volumes should permit the early study of the years of Nigerian crisis at undergraduate level and it is to be hoped that the Nigerian universities will be courageous enough to do so because the present can only be well understood if there is knowledge of the past.

J. H. SMITH

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN ASIA, HAHN-BEEN LEE and ABELARDO G. SAMONTE (Eds); *EROPA, Manila,* 1970; pp. xix+322.

In 1968 Eropa managed to produce a group of papers which were remarkable in concentrating to a considerable degree on actual case studies in administrative reform and in being by local scholars. Admittedly EROPA and its Development Advisory Group have always been in close touch with overseas and especially American experts: in this case people like Gorvine, Dotson, Esman, Weidner, Gable, Dye and Gant. It is all the more interesting that this very influential network has produced such a list of administrative writers, many with institutional as well as academic experience: a sort of reproduction in the American (if also European) model of an older Asian tradition. Carefully prepared as they were in 1968 (for Bangkok and then for Kuala Lumpur) how do these papers read in 1971?

Samonte's case is the Filipino effort since 1950s, through the Wage and Position Classification Office, to set up a new classification system for the whole national public service, first by Presidential fiat, more or less, and then with much congressional intervention: a typical example of a technical assistance model for administrative development, as Weidner, for instance, has pointed out. In the dyadic patronage system of the Filipino political culture this must certainly have been an interesting experience and Samonte is frank enough in his conclusions. "The results have been disappointing. For such modern administrative standards as efficiency, merit and specialization usually clash with conventional norms based on expediency, persona-

lism and diffuseness". At the same time, Samonte goes into sufficient detail for his paper to be more than a tale of woe. It does try to explain the actual timetable and methods of WAPCO. Indeed, it gives an almost blow by blow account: congressional reactions, deferred implementation of salary laws and so forth.

Hahn-Been Lee writes about a three phase budget reform in Korea, 1955–61, which he himself conducted through the Bureau of the Budget (1958–61 as Director, in fact). He is fair about the failure of performance budgeting, as compared with the results of a business-type accounting system. That, then, deals with the second of Weidner's technical assistance trio. A later paper, by Suk-Choon Cho, deals with two reforms in the next phase in Korea: the military regime immediately after the anti-Democratic Party coup of May 1961. The instances taken are the introduction of the first 5-year plan and the setting up, therefore, of an Economic Planning Board, and the application of a planning and programming system in the civilian administration. This is the more interesting if the background is known: the use of programming and planning by the Korean military since 1954 because of the translation of the US armed forces manual. The reforms of 1961–3 began after a hectic few weeks, as Cho says, when the coup leaders (Park Chung Hee, Yu Won Shik and others) had been "busy in wiping out the politicians, getting the support of the army . . . and also getting the support of the U.N. Command, the U.S. Embassy and President Yun". This mixture of coup politics, steps in planning and changes in the machinery of government makes fascinating reading; the later parts are less interesting, but they do show very clearly that the changes are about politics, not about neutral principles.

A preceding paper is also about reform and the military: Sondang P. Siagian's study of Indonesia 1966–68 as the administration got ready for the plan to be launched in 1969. Siagian may not have quite the critical sense of the editors nor the vividness of some of Cho's pages but he does not need them as he recalls Sukarno's "Dwikora" Cabinet of 100 portfolios and the post-coup Suharto "Ampera" Cabinet committed, *inter al.*, to being "simple in structure". As Siagian says, "in the Indonesian situation where utter chaos in government administration had prevailed the very creation of some orderly institutional form had been an essential beginning of administrative reform". True enough, and it is interesting to read about the first moves away from the most ideological and broken backed of regimes. Siagian makes nine reservations at the end: a brave paper.

The chairman of the public administration division at the University of Malaya, Mavis Putchucheary, writes a tidy paper about the use of the "operations Room" technique for rural development. Like Cho's case, this has a military origin: the very successful Operations Room of the Emergency. Development administration should certainly be ready to learn, if it can, from military and crisis methods. Has the use of the operations room in the Ministry of National and Rural Development, along with levels of committees, briefings and field inspections and "redbook" plans (not Maoist but minor works programmes in the hands of district officers and committees!) really helped Malay planning? The paper claims so, but one wonders how critical

it is. The more one reads the following, the more worried one feels. "In Malaysia, however, the rural development committees did not create confusion as the technical departments continued to be completely in charge of performing their functions. The committees were not given any executive functions to perform. The committees were therefore not intended as a means to decentralize power to local government institutions as in the *panchayati raj* system of India or the basic democracies system of Pakistan. It was merely a device to bring about greater efficiency in administration".

Amara Raksasataya's paper is a contrast: if it is a case study it is a long case; simply the history of administrative training (or "preparing administrators" in his nice phrase) in Thailand from the temple education of the traditional bureaucracy, the pages of the Chakri reform and so on. This is very interesting indeed, if already partly available in Siffin's Thai Bureaucracy and Riggs' book about Thailand. The next two papers also cover long periods: Hsueh's is limited by the scope of the reforms themselves. As he says, in Hong Kong "the administration recognizes its proper role in economic development" and Hong Kong has a very peculiar constitutional and political position among these other studies (as the author, a product of Geneva and to an extent Oxford does, with J. N. Khosla, among these Americanophonic writers). But Khosla, in covering nothing less than the 1954–64, 1964–66 and Administrative Reforms Commission phases in administrative reform in India, has a very different task. This is a succinct but masterly survey of what must be by far the major attempt in developing countries to use the big commission to achieve machinery of government reform (the Haldane, Brownlow, Hoover method carried to the Nth degree). Khosla manages to be clear about the implications of formulating reform plans irrespective of the conditions of implementation.

The conditional nature of administration and the dependence of its reform on other variations is shown in this as in most of the other papers. Hence one's queasy feelings about the dichotomies of the Malaysian paper and the importance of Jose Abueva's discussion of administrative reform and culture: more important, on the whole, than the essentially summary papers by the editors (Lee on The Concept, Structure and Strategy of Administrative Reform and Samonte's Patterns and Trends in Administrative Reform). Lee makes some good points on innovation and on what then administrative reform should be about: programmes, clients, internal communication. But for him, too, "the environment" is one of the three factors, along with the nature of the reform and the reform agents. Samonte attempts a limiting definition of administrative reform and then a few comparative points, rather in the style of those general reports at UN conferences based on replies to serried ranks of national questionnaires. But he also goes well beyond that to indicate certain trends and changes in method and approach. He ends with a word on the "political imperatives". Is he not saying that administrative reform, in these parts of Asia at least, is becoming less and less a technical assistance exercise and more and more part of the local political scene?

It is Abueva's that is the most sophisticated, reflective and intriguing paper: who, for example, in these cultures will be those (whom he calls the Moderns)

who will accept those innovations which administrative reform is likely to be about? What will their relatives think of them: ***walang hiya***, perhaps? Interestingly enough, this does not prevent him from a degree of optimism. But does it not make him something of an élitist social engineer? Of course, administrative reform always had a moralistic tone, political ends and an interest in military examples: think of Woodrow Wilson or Urwick. The definitions and distinctions between reform and reorganization have changed, but reform and reorganization are certainly still about politics; the military now seems to be a little more evident; the moralism as much as ever. Is there still a smile on the face of the Buddha?

B. B. SCHAFFER

CO-OPERATIVES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA, Ed CARL GOSTA WIDSTRAND; Pub *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies Uppsala and Africana Publishing Corporation New York* 1970; pp. 271.

This book is a collection of the papers presented at a seminar on Co-operatives and Rural Development organized by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. It is rich both in ideas and information and one only wonders how the participants can have begun to do justice to all this material in the two days for which they appear to have met. The preface says the Institute wanted to choose a topic that would be of interest both to academics and also to planners, administrators and politicians. This review will attempt to show, by means of a few examples, that the needs of the second group have not been forgotten. Most of the academic speculation has a real relevance to practical needs.

In his introduction, the editor points out that the decision on whether to base an agricultural credit scheme on mortgageable individual titles to land or to operate it with other types of security, probably through Co-operatives, is not a mere technical question. It is one of the basic decisions about the kind of rural society that is going to be created. In other words, it ought only to come within the province of the administrator after the answers to some very basic questions about political and social objectives have been made clear.

There is some useful fundamental thinking about what Co-operatives are for. As Raymond Apthorpe says they, "are the outward expression of an economic religion in Eastern Africa". Unless the more extravagant prophecies of the religion are weighed objectively at an early stage, the disillusion will be too great when that which they foretell fails to come to pass. On the economic side, creation of Co-operatives is not a substitute for detailed thought about such things as transportation to and from collecting points. Replacement of commercial middlemen by single channel marketing through Co-operatives does not inevitably increase the reward to the grower. On the social and political side, Co-operatives may entrench and enlarge income differentials rather than ushering in greater equality. One must also question whether a government which has entrusted the collection and processing of a major foreign exchange earner to a Co-operative monopoly is ever going to be able to give the growers the decisive voice in the control of the resulting structure.

In an interesting contribution on Co-operatives and the Law in East Africa, J. P. W. B. McAuslan points out that in a fully commercial society, the laws which give the lender a right to realize his security are workable because they hardly ever have to be used. Social pressure, "doing what comes naturally", and the value borrowers place on maintaining their credit rating are enough to ensure that nearly all those who can repay their loans do so. In Eastern Africa the same is not true. Since the legal sanctions cannot be applied to masses of borrowers, they lose their deterrent effect. MacAuslan devotes some pages to discussing possible alternatives. He also makes a plea that lawyers should be brought in at the formative stage of Co-operative policy. They cannot make their full contribution if they are either told to shape a law to conform with the outcome of discussions in which they had no part or, worse still, merely told to frame a law on something like Co-operative credit without being given the necessary background brief.

So far the examples given have been of relevance to those who shape policy in the capital rather than to the field worker. To stop at this would not represent the book fairly. There is a detailed case study of the Lushoto District of Tanzania in Lionel Cliffe's contribution. Nelson Kasfir uses a comparative study to highlight the importance of developing top managers in Co-operative Unions who can play their proper role as a foil to the power of the elected committee. Raymond Apthorpe shows how the imposition of Co-operatives lowered production of pyrethrum when it removed the incentive of direct payment from the women who did the picking, to the Co-operative of which only men were members.

In all, this is a most useful book and anyone who hasn't time to read it all should at least read the editor's own contributions. They summarise most of the important issues and give the book a coherence which this collection of quoted examples does not reveal. One must share the hopes and fears expressed by Dan Nyanjom in the last sentence of the book, "that the usefulness of this worthy effort will not be restricted to a mere get-together and exchange of ideas with literature to carry back home – while the actual problems live on".

PETER YEO

WHAT IS EDUCATIONAL PLANNING? by PHILIP H. COOMBS *UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning*; pp. 61; 6p.

This is a modest pamphlet in size and price. It is also written in a modest fashion by the former and first Director of the International Institute for Educational Planning in Paris. The claims made for the discipline are anything but modest and the author makes a convincing case for pitching them pretty high in the light of a historical analysis of what has so far been attempted and what remains to be done. One of the principal obstacles to progress which Dr. Coombs recognizes but is as yet unable to resolve is the problem of where educational planning takes place. It is all very well to say it is essentially "the standard business of virtually every operator in the system, not least of all, the teachers"; but without a firm basis at the heart of the policy making apparatus of central or local government, educational planning

is in grave danger of being accorded far too little attention by politicians and administrators. A recent writer on educational politics in Britain has recorded that the establishment of a Planning Branch in the Department of Education and Science was the only occasion for Ministerial fiat during Mr. Anthony Crosland's tenure of office (The Politics of Education, Maurice Kogan, Penguin Education Special 1971, page 183).

L. W. N.

Book Notes

A.B.C. OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, A GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS AND INSTITUTIONS, *H.M. Stationery Office for the Overseas Development Administration,* 1971; pp. 83; index; 30p.

A for African Development Bank etc. etc., Y for Yaounde Convention. This indeed is an admirable guidebook and the Information department of the ODA is to be warmly congratulated on its production. Few of those who deal with aid know what *all* the multitude of modern abbreviations stand for in the aid field, still less for what purpose all of the organizations/bodies/ programmes described actually function. Now here are set out the more important facets of aid, briefly described in very readable form and in a booklet ideally sized for slipping into a coat pocket. For the non-specialist with an interest in aid matters – at Universities and schools, embassies and ministries, newspaper and current affairs offices, there is no simpler means of checking up on definitions in the field of aid and development than in this, the first-ever glossary of its kind published in Britain.

SCANDINAVIAN DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES, by CARL GOSTA WIDSTRAND and ZDENEK CERVENKA; *The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala* 1971; notes and annexes; pp. 74.

Scandinavian aid is largely directed towards Africa and in particular to East/Central Africa. In some cases assistance has understandably been directed towards areas where Scandinavian Missionaries had become well established and well liked – hence perhaps the extent to which Tanzania has benefited. The authors, a little primly, and with much truth, suggest that Scandinavian efforts "may be ascribed to a large extent to feelings of moral duty and international solidarity" – a little primly too, they suggest that Scandinavian aid is on the most generous, least-tied and most liberal terms.

This volume of facts and figures and policies of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden's aid programmes was first presented in draft to the United Nations Seminar on African Law, held in Accra in January 1971 – hence, understandably perhaps, the rather uncritical study which generally takes a line which the sponsors and the hosts would warmly welcome.

It is good to see forthright criticism of the extent to which diplomatic privileges and immunities have been extended to UN technical experts, where surely the UN convention on privileges was intended for UN officials whose role clearly differs from that of experts on assignments – perhaps this is a field in which Africa could stimulate reform and clearly the authors favour the removal of the special immunities which in some cases (and somewhat surprisingly) are extended to Scandinavian technical assistance experts.

Where Nordic aid is concentrated, how technical co-operation is managed in each Scandinavian country, the form their aid agreements take, joint Nordic projects, are clearly set out; the statistics unfortunately are not provided in a uniform manner in respect of each country. Clearly the quantum of aid is increasing and in so far as Norway and Sweden are concerned a greater proportion of aid is earmarked as bilateral.

In their conclusion the authors point out that "development assistance is never really free from politics and no doubt its aspects will continue to be challenged at various levels in each country, no doubt we shall have increased and more heated discussion on which countries should be chosen as partners in co-operation". In Scandinavia, if not elsewhere, aid to conservative or reactionary regimes has been criticized. Finally comes a word of wise warning that increased aid "will most likely be influenced by the national economic situation".

THE COMMONWEALTH 1970, by LESTER B. PEARSON; *Cambridge University Press*; pp. 32; 40p.

In Mr. Pearson's 1970 Smuts Memorial Lecture, he finds the evolution of the Commonwealth a fascinating study. "There has certainly been nothing like this in history". He mentions several Commonwealth landmarks: "failure to maintain a single foreign policy and diplomatic unity, after full self-government became the basis of association". The arrangement for Eire to leave the Commonwealth and still retain the prequisites of membership, the arrangements whereby first India and later other members became Republics within the Commonwealth. Not surprisingly some new insight is provided as to Canadian thinking and Canadian action over Commonwealth problems, not surprisingly either from such a distinguished internationalist, Mr. Pearson concludes his lecture with a call for the Commonwealth to "find a new value to its members, above all in co-operation for development and mutual aid . . . Commonwealth co-operation in export development, in development banking, and in technical assistance, matters indeed that are covered in one of the first directives given to the Commonwealth Secretariat to assist member governments at their request in advancing and obtaining support for development projects . . . on a multilateral Commonwealth basis'."

The rare quality of these Smuts lectures is such one hopes that the C.U.P. may produce a volume including all those delivered in the post war era.

THE EMERGENCE OF INDIAN NATIONALISM, by ANIL SEAL; *Cambridge University Press*; with maps, tables, appendices, glossary, bibliography and index; pp. 416; £1.00.

In effect this admirably produced volume provides invaluable background to Kumar's *Essays on Ghandian Politics* reviewed in the October 1971 Number of this Journal.

It is doubtful if the Indian Continent has ever lacked nationalism or political factions. What Anil Seal is presenting here is the setting wherein the Indian National Congress emerged a century ago to develop in the subsequent decades as the dominant force on the Indian political scene. The focus is on three States and on Western educated Indians. This concentration provides a remarkably clear picture which no broad continental coverage could have achieved.

The author is tempted into a final chapter on "Perspectives" which hurries the reader through the Twenties into the Forties all in ten pages. This, perhaps, is a pity as the well argued Nineteenth Century chapters are rather incongruously provided with the more modern peroration containing a very superficial judgment on Gandhi's retention of Congress leadership. This, however, is only a minor blemish in a book which will surely have a wide appeal to scholars and students of Indian history – providing as it does a well authenticated and penetrating analysis of how the founding fathers of modern Indian politics laid their early stones.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1969, Ed. K. B. MADHAVA; *Ocean Publications, Inc*; Index, pp. 399; $10.00

"Challenges to Prevalent Ideas on Development" was the chosen theme for the eleventh World Congress of the Society for International Development, the proceedings of which are published in this volume.

The editor has achieved no mean feat in assembling, within 400 pages, the large number of papers, notes, discussion reports, opening and closing speeches, that filled four days intensive examination of the problems of the Third World as the new decade of the Seventies approached.

Questions considered were: Do the goals of development need redefining? The challenge of aid-weariness; manpower and education; population education; social communications; political and social-cultural requisites of development; challenges to development theorists and strategists.

Contributions from a wide range of specialists make varied and worthwhile reading not only for the participants of the SID gathering, but for all who are interested in the developing countries of the world.

THE NYORO STATE, by JOHN BEATTIE; *Oxford University Press, the Clarendon Press,* 1971; plates, maps, bibliography, index; pp. 280; £3.00.

Quite correctly the publishers describe this admirably produced book as "a study of social and political change, and the decline and fall of the ancient kingdom" (of Bunyoro), for the new Uganda constitution of 1967 had set up a republic and abolished all the four Kingdoms within the State.

Since John Beattie described the political process which involved the post-independence return of the "lost counties" bringing long awaited if short-lived satisfaction to the Bunyoro Kingdom, then the establishment of Dr Obote's republic, the 1971 *coup d'état* of General Amin has seen a further change in the political process and the establishment of a conservative less radical regime which no doubt has greater sympathy with the aspiration of the former Kingdoms than its predecessor.

John Beattie compares the Nyoro State with that of Buganda, for long its powerful, dominant and frequently hostile neighbour. Both ecologically and culturally the differences were considerable, much of Nyoro higher, drier and less fertile; concentrated plantain cultivators of Buganda, dispersed millet growing and pastoral people of Nyoro; Luganda and Runyoro closely related but markedly different languages.

This is a scholarly work and besides its very topical interest, its appeal is the greater for author's avoidance of irritating socio-anthropological jargon.

LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1948-1963, by JANET ROBERTSON; *Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press,* 1971; bibliography, index; pp. 252; £2.25.

The final chapter of Janet Robertson's study of Liberalism in South Africa is strangely entitled "the dismantling of the liberal state". There was little in 1968 that could be related to a state of liberalism, indeed the dismantling of a state that possessed only vestiges of liberalism began when the Act of Union was bought at the cost of sacrificing African and coloured civil rights to the appeasement of Boerish racial attitudes, and it ended (or at least the right of liberalism to exist was deferred indefinitely) when the Nationalists with their minority of votes defeated Smuts in 1948.

Miss Robertson saw no alternative to the dissolution of a Liberal Party committed to equal political rights, once the nationalist government introduced it's "Prohibition of Improper Interference Act" and made inter-racial political activity illegal. The Progressives chose to carry on and as and when the stays of intolerance are eased it may be that this will be the party to gain the most advantage.

What this book does make clear is that the nationalists once in power, never doubting their destiny as white supremacists, were determined, tough and rough enough, to suppress the diverse forms of ideological political opposition that their own policies aroused. The "official" opposition bereft of its progressive wing has proved too ideologically akin to themselves to warrant any serious intimidatory action.

LUGARD AND THE AMALGAMATION OF NIGERIA, a documentary record, compiled and introduced by A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE; *Frank Cass*; pp. 281; £3.50.

This book first appeared very appropriately when events in Nigeria had many people asking whether the original amalgamation of the erstwhile "three Nigerias" was wise and whether the Oil Rivers (later Niger Coast) Protectorate, the Colony of Lagos and the Niger Territories of the Royal Niger Company, should have remained separate at least to the extent of North and South.

Mr. Kirk-Greene has served Africanist Scholars well in providing this basic documentary record, the principal part being devoted to Lord Lugard's Report on Amalgamation (Cmd. 468 of 1920) – the founder's broad review of the progress made in the first five years of unification most of which coincided with the First World War, the former Governments of Southern and Northern Nigeria having been formally amalgamated on 1st January 1914, with Lord Lugard as Governor-General.

As Mr. Kirk-Greene writes in his perceptive introduction "the fundamental Amalgamation of 1914 seems set to remain a focal point of interest in any discussion on Nigeria's constitutional history for many years to come. Root causes of the national (near) disintegration of 1967 will be looked for in the deliberate unification policy scheme of 1914 and Nigerian as well as outside political scientists seem destined to spend many an hour seeking to evaluate what went wrong in the (successive) attempts to derive from Lugard's concept of a single Protectorate of Southern and Northern Nigeria a unified, independent and viable nation". The editor also suggests that General Gowon's creation of new states may help, through semantics, as now there is no need for the political terminology of North and South "the trigger-phrases of Nigerian administrative thought" for so long.

THE GAULLIST PHENOMENON, by JEAN CHARLOT; *George Allen and Unwin*; index; pp. 205; £2.75 (cloth), £1.50 (paper).

Early in 1968 students swarmed the streets of Paris chanting "de Gaulle adieu, adieu de Gaulle" and all but a few commentators of the scene felt that an era was ended and the phenomenon of Gaullism was in eclipse. The leader of the Free French who had relinquished power on a matter of high principle when none could have dethroned him, who returned after the 1958 *coup d'etat* in Algiers – in a sense restored to power by the army hawks whom he proceeded to suppress, then provided not merely Algeria but all French Africa (Somaliland excepted) with the passport to Independence within the French Community. By the Spring of 1968 the future of the soldier-statesman seemed dim. Yet he turned the tables on his opponents, won a resounding electoral victory and then almost gratuitously challenged the electorate yet again and this time unsuccessfully, in a referendum which he chose to regard as a vote of confidence. Even then his immediate retirement saw Gaullism continue under new management.

Jean Charlot whose study is largely concentrated on public opinion and opinion polls, who believed Gaullism had come to stay in the shape of a votes-oriented party – something new to France, was proved right and the polls proved wrong, for he reckoned that "the Gaullist party based its organization on its function in the new political system of the Fifth Republic . . . by which it justified itself. This function was to pave the way for the establishment of a majority parliamentary system in a country where the multi-party system . . . (had) created a long tradition of government by assembly". Above all, of course, was the President himself whose disinterestedness was undoubted – "his own interests were as nothing before the national interest" – for this reason he did not lack success when he tried to solicit among the French a similar subordination of the individual to France.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND EDUCATION, by KENNETH JAMES KING; *Clarendon Press*: *Oxford University Press*, 1971; maps, plates, appendices, bibliography, index; pp. 296; £4.00.

This book has the strange sub-title of "a study of race philanthropy and education in the Southern States of America and East Africa". It looks as if the author's endeavours have been a labour of love, placing on record the story of devoted, often liberal, sometimes naive missionary zeal which helped bring a new look to African education in Kenya. Credit, in a sense, is claimed for the Kenya Institute of Administration which emerged from the new-look African Jeanes school at Kabete, (with a war time interim as a military training centre) into a well founded local base for public service training.

This study places on the record little known information about early Afro-American educational links. African scholars and students will find here a particularly interesting source of cultural and educational information. The author should now have ensured that the role of Tuskegee will not be forgotten; of additional value is the excellent bibliography which is provided.

BRITAIN AND THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION, *Central Office of Information, London*; (RF. P. 5865/70); pp. 49.

This pamphlet provides a brief and very readable account of the translation of an Empire into a Commonwealth composed of freely associated members.

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
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